was there also. We went into the coffee shop to wait for the baggage. Guest was to take my family and me to our house. So I asked Colonel Duke if I could go home with my family and meet tomorrow morning to be oriented.

He said, "This is your orientation now. I'm getting on that airplane you got off of and going back to New York. So if you want to ask me some questions, you've got about 20 minutes." [Laughter]

I didn't know what to ask, so I said, "Well, I'll see you, Colonel. Thanks for holding the line. What do you suggest I do?"

He said, "I want you to do one thing: get the damn hospital turned over." That's the project which got this other fellow in trouble. Duke left shortly thereafter. So we all went over to our house and settled in. Our assignment at Goose Bay, another critical assignment, began. This wasn't supposed to be good in a lot of people's minds, but it proved to be outstanding. Lots of reasons.

One, there was limited communications with the district headquarters in New York. I couldn't call on the phone. I could communicate by radio, and that was problematical because of the weather conditions. If I wrote a letter, it took a couple of weeks. Colonel Morton Solomon's philosophy was very simple, "You're out on the end of the line where I can't help you. Just do a good job. I can't afford to have somebody out there that can't do the job."

Turned out that every colonel that survived an assignment to a remote site later became a general. Carroll Dunn, Bill Stames, Frank Koisch, Dick McConnell, myself. Solomon's track record in developing officers to their full potential was great. He gave you every opportunity to succeed, but he didn't protect you to the point where you couldn't fail. He wrote all his efficiency reports in longhand. Somewhere there's one on me to the effect that with a little more experience I'd be a pretty good officer, and that was about the size of it.

Well, anyhow, there I was at the end of the line, so to speak, and we then proceeded to put in 20 months of the most concentrated, 100 percent effort of any time in my life because of the circumstances. We only had a few months of the year to work outside so we had to spend the whole winter doing inside work, preparing and planning for the next construction season, and then executing it efficiently. Safety was a great problem because of ice, snow, and extreme cold. The Goose Bay program involved placing 18 inches of concrete over the runways, installing a complete automated refueling system, rather sophisticated, a central heating system for the base, 400 new houses, new electric distribution, and much more.

The new electric power plant included two 2,000-kilowatt generators. They had to be tested in the wintertime, and we had no way to test them except by using the base load. General Knapp decided at the last minute it was too big of a risk. He feared that if the new generator broke down, it would damage the old diesel generators, and the flight line would be shut down.

So we had to come up with another way to do it. Interestingly enough, we used a construction camp for the base load. We organized everybody so that at a certain time of a fixed day they'd plug in all their irons, their space heaters, and turn on every piece of electricity they could find. We generated enough demand out of our construction camp that we could test these generators.

That was the one time I got in dangerous straits with Colonel Solomon. I had sent a requirement down to the district telling them of my dilemma when the commanding general had changed his mind on letting us use the base load. The base suggested we build a water rheostat, so I fired down there a letter asking the district for some help on this thing, especially if they have any better ideas. I got this long document back, which some staff person sent me. It didn't say a thing I didn't already know. So I fired back another wire, which I'm sure got to Solomon, that said, "I don't need all this information. I just want a decision." That created a little problem, I think, but it also probably got their attention because I had explained what I was going to do and I wanted

to find out if there was any objection to putting at risk the whole construction program in Goose Bay. We proceeded on our own, alone.

The first thing after we turned on the generator, it blew out one of the fuse boxes. I thought, "Oh, Lord, here we go." Fortunately it was a wiring problem. We hadn't put the generator on line yet, but still I felt we were going to be in one hell of a mess before it was all over. However, we tested them with the construction camp as a load and all worked out just fine.

That was one problem. Trees were another. At Goose Bay you couldn't drive a tractor near a tree because the roots were so close to the surface. General Knapp would not stand to have a tree removed or killed. His point was well taken because the windblown sand up there raised havoc with jet aircraft and caused big maintenance problems. The trees, the tundra, and the moss that grows on top of the ground reduced the sand, so we had to be very careful. Every time we'd knock down a tree I personally had to go see him. I didn't like to go see him.

We had safety problems. A blizzard overloaded the roof on a big warehouse containing the base communications supplies. The base engineer was not well equipped to repair the damage so I suggested to the base commander that he give the Corps the job. We promised to have that warehouse roof back in a couple of days. Then we would figure out what happened and fix it permanently. He agreed and we delivered. Then we got into a big deal about why it failed. The Corps had built these warehouses. It turned out that the maintenance people had not routinely tightened the wood connectors. In time, they had gotten loose, and the heavy wind caused one of the trusses to fail, and then the next bay and so forth.

Then building the airfield; you can only pave with the temperature at 40 degrees and rising. Some days everything was ready, all the trucks and plants working, and it'd be 35 degrees. You'd wait and look for the sun; it wouldn't come. When we could pave you can imagine we were very active because the total annual outside work season was only about 90 days.

Then, in the winter, we had tremendous snows. In 1955-56 220 inches of snow fell from September until June, and the first flake never melted. So the snow removal problem was immense as was land movement. Just getting around was a problem. Still, our children never missed a day of school. They went to the Canadian school. The road-clearing facilities were outstanding. The minute it started to snow or the wind started to blow, the plows started to work and the roads were kept open.

When Gerry and I wanted to go to the officers' club, which was in walking distance, we would get all bundled up. If it was a formal dance she'd tie up her dress, put on boots, carry her bag, and as soon as she got in the club, take off her boots and put on her dancing shoes. The weather was a constant challenge, often 30 or 40 degrees below zero. We had airmen who would try to run from the NCO club back to their barracks, and they'd get frostbitten in a few minutes.

We finished the hospital. I should have put that in earlier. I had the hospital turned over within three weeks. That was done with a lot of cooperation from the base. We had a long punch list of things yet to be done, but they accepted it because they wanted the hospital working.

Gerry got a job over there. She was the head nurse and ran the dependents' clinic for over a year, which was quite nice and made her stay much more enjoyable, especially in the winters. Our little dog, who had no hair, found Goose Bay unacceptable. He had to go out even in the cold weather. We felt so sorry for him. He didn't spend much time doing his business, I can tell you that.

Q: What had been the problem with the hospital construction?

A: It's just they couldn't get the thing finished. The new central heating system for the bases was the major delay that caused the hospital to be way behind schedule. Also trouble with some of the equipment and its installation.

Q: What about the contractor and your contract?

A: The contract was with Merritt-Chapman and Scott and Johnson, Drake and Piper-a joint venture called Drake-Merritt. This contract was like the Atlas contract used in North Africa, a cost-plus/price-redetermination contract. The contractor would build everything as a cost-plus and, at the end of the job, auditors determined a final cost and, as I recall, allowed 6 percent profit.

Contract administration was significant. We had 35 people in the Corps office. Our administrative assistant, Mr. Olsen, knew the procurement and administration regulations of the Corps. Olsen's favorite response to any requirement was, "No sweat on the Goose." The chief engineer was Bob Coy, a GS-13. His group included an electrical section, a mechanical section, inspectors, et cetera. I had a deputy who looked after personnel and the internal matters, and I handled dealings with the post commander and with the contractor. The contractor's principal man was Clyde Newcomb and his deputy was Frank DiMatteo. I hired Frank DiMatteo to work for the Corps in Washington years later when he was the engineer for USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development]. Any rate, at Goose Bay he was a young engineer for Drake-Merritt.

Executing this contract was a fabulous experience for me. The experience came in very handy later. It's strange how these things work out. My good fortune was that every assignment provided an experience that was needed and important later.

To execute our contract, prepricing changes was critical before work began. Failure to control prices was also a problem at the hospital. I recall that to regain control we established a price ceiling for the entire remaining hospital work, rather than trying to work out a price on every nut and bolt.

Every morning at 8 o'clock we'd meet on the work for the day and how it was going to be handled. We used a Title 2 contract with Fay, Spofford, and Thomdyke out of Boston for the inspection work. They were, in effect, part of the Corps' area office. During the construction season Fay, Spofford, and Thomdyke had about 20 people. Their top man up there was retired Corps of Engineers Brigadier General Mason Young. I respected his judgment, of course, and he respected my position, so we managed to work together.

Fay, Spofford, and Thomdyke had designed the Goose Bay program. So in a sense they were inspecting themselves. The Corps supervisors feared the Title 2 contractor was overlooking mistakes in design and therefore letting the contractor do some things that probably shouldn't be done. There was no substantive indication that that was true, however. Still, it was a cause for some tension.

Progress under these arrangements became very good. Our administration was very complicated because of the type of contract. The team [contractor and Corps] did finally develop the attitude we wanted: "Let's get this job done." We burned a lot of midnight oil on those contract administration and contract changes. Getting Mr. Newcomb to become a cooperative partner in this was one of my main challenges.

Internally we were tough on some personnel behavior like drinking, tardiness, et cetera. The contractors' employees arrived in the summertime by the hundreds; in the wintertime they were cut back. They lived in a big bamlike warehouse-type structure with double-decker bunks. It wasn't too bad but just a lot of people in one place. They ran a wonderful mess and the food was outstanding. The contractor also provided good medical facilities which Corps employees used.

The type of contract and the type of contractor we had under the circumstances proved to be of great value later on in Vietnam, the Israeli airfields, Saudi Arabia, et cetera.

In my recollection, that probably was the first job that put me so clearly in harm's way and into rough going. There was a constant opportunity to fail. If you didn't pay attention to your job you would get fired-and you'd probably deserve it. I can't think of many circumstances where the demands on the area engineer, on a day-to-day basis, carried any higher risk than trying to convert Goose Bay to a Strategic Air Command base under a boss like Solomon and a client like Knapp.

In conjunction with the Goose Air Base project, we had the "Gap Filler" sites. Gap Filler included a group of intermediate communications stations being built to fill the gaps in the old Pine Tree Network sites across northern Canada. Together they were to monitor and intercept Russian missiles or aircraft. The Gap Filler sites were from Frobisher Bay south to about the Goose Bay area.

Major John Kelley, a West Point classmate, was in Goose and in charge of the Gap Filler program. He reported to me. I did go to the sites occasionally by single-engine airplanes controlled by bush pilots. That was a thrilling experience on occasion.

The only native activity near Goose Air Base was a little village called Happy Valley on the Hamilton River. We could go there for the Hudson Bay store. Happy Valley was a fishing village. In the summertime the Eskimos would come and fish; in the wintertime most of them would go someplace. There'd always be some around, so we got a glimpse at the native life. Happy Valley was it because Goose Air Base is in the middle of a mass of lakes and tundra. Charles Lindbergh founded this site while looking for air base sites in the World War II period. As I said, the Corps' job in 1955 to 1957 was to convert it from a medium- to a heavy-aircraft facility and provide the base infrastructure to support the new operation.

Then I became the central player in an event which turned out to be important for me in a unique way. I was pulled out of Goose Bay in April 1957, three or four months earlier than the commitment to stay 24 months. That upset General Knapp to the extent that he wrote a letter to the Chief of Engineers, seriously complaining about this. I guess if I had done a poor job he wouldn't have had anything to complain about. In any event, he told the Chief what a great job I was doing and that pulling me out earlier was contrary to the agreement and was a very serious matter to him.

Frankly, I think he was mostly mad that the Corps went back on its agreement, but in the process I benefitted. By this time, Colonel Solomon had been replaced by Colonel [Aldo H.] Bagnulo, just one of the nicest men you'll ever meet. Solomon had retired and gone to work for Metcalf and Eddy.

Q: What was your next assignment?

A: I left Goose Air Base and reported to OCE [Office of the Chief of Engineers] to head up the assignments division for Corps officers in the grade of lieutenant colonel and lower. In those days, you recall, the officers were assigned by the Chief of Engineers. This was April 1957.

Besides General Knapp's complaint, the move led to another issue. Colonel Dick Hennessy, who had agreed to send me to Goose Bay, had promised me that when I came out of Labrador Bay I would get a battalion. In fact, for a short while I was earmarked for the 10th Engineers, 3d Infantry Division, in August. The orders were changed to read OCE personnel and Hennessy got quite upset. So here came this complaint from Hennessy, for whom everybody had great admiration, raising hell because I wasn't going to go to a battalion. I would just as soon have come in quietly, but I wasn't allowed to do that. I finally arrived at OCE and stayed for three

years, getting to know most of the officers in the Corps while handling personnel assignments. That also turned out to be a valuable staff experience.

I had had an opportunity in both public works and military construction in dealing with the other services, and now I was going to get my first taste of staff duty and personnel management, a completely different field. I'd been in the supply business in Europe, and now the personnel business.

To be assigned to the personnel division was a compliment. Why? Simply because they had the choice of all officers available for assignment. They wouldn't bring in somebody they didn't want.

Initially I wasn't too sure about this type of assignment, but it turned out to be excellent. Once again I found myself working for people who were excellent managers and supervisors with the ability to express themselves well. I was to enter a job which would educate me about the Army and its personnel policies. In time I knew the records of almost all the engineer officers. I knew what they were doing and what jobs were best for each. Consequently, I had an influence on a lot of people's lives. I selected those to attend civilian graduate and military schools and was responsible for the duty assignments of all lieutenant colonels and lower.

Ed Gibson was a captain working for me at the time. K.T. Sawyer, lieutenant colonel at the time, was there, and Colonel Bob Ploger, who handled the military program. Steven Hamner, a brigadier general, ran the total personnel office, military and civilian.

The first Saturday in the job I got called to the Chief's office. I'd never met General Itschner before. The Corps was considering sending the dredge *Henry Bacon* and an engineer company to the area and he wanted to know a bit about it. I felt fortunate to meet the Chief of Engineers early on in this assignment. Incidentally, I had known the dredge when I was in Savannah-its home district.

The tour in OCE, though, was another segment of broadening the base of experience. I recommend an assignment in the personnel business, but be prepared wherever you go to ask about your next assignment.

I felt my mission was to do everything I could to give every officer the best chance to become a general. Every assignment was based on what was the best for the officer within the needs of the Army. In peacetime I think the approach is crucial to assignments personnel because they are really training an officer to have the most value during stressful situations. If they capitalize on individual strengths and assign him to a job that broadens those, he's going to be better than if he is just kept doing the same thing over and over again.

In considering a captain's assignment, we'd start with the idea that we were going to get him to Leavenworth. Now, if he was in Leavenworth we were going to assign him with the idea to get into War College. We looked upon the school systems as the stepping stones to growth. Half the officers make Leavenworth, and a fourth of them make the War College. If an officer gets through all those, then he has a chance to make stars. We studied everybody's record when he'd come up for assignments. We'd look at what he'd done, what he needed to do, and his preferences. Actually, the preference card was important. Pretty soon the officers began to realize that their preference cards should be built around what they thought they needed.

One civilian handled the colonels' assignments-Percy was his name, but all full colonels' assignments were approved by then Colonel Ploger.

So that was a three-year hitch. I spent one year doing the assignments, one year in the policy branch, where we wrote the policies and did studies to foresee the personnel requirements,

acquisition needs, et cetera. Then the third year I was exec to the head of the military assignments. By this time Colonel Ploger had been replaced by Kelley, Roy Kelley. Both of those people made general. The fact is, practically everybody assigned to that position made general.

So anyhow, during those three years I became familiar with the Pentagon and also saw the Chief of Engineers on occasion. I learned how staffs worked and began to know many people I would see later.

The assignment team at OCE always went to the military schools and announced assignments, just like Hennessy at Leavenworth. Well, I did that for the C&GSC and senior service schools and also West Point. I'd tell the USMA graduates who selected the Corps of Engineers where they were going to go and discuss the Corps' opportunities. Frequently we'd go to Belvoir and talk to the advanced course officers.

The Chief of Engineers commanded all engineer officers, the troop units, and the Engineer School. I left OCE in 1960. Later, the Chief lost personnel management, and though it may have been good for the Army, it wasn't too good for the Corps because the Corps absolutely had the best career management program in the Army. I left there in 1960. In 1962 or 1963 they did away with the branches. Every branch soon reached a common level, and in the process the Corps' branch career management suffered because the career management within the Army as a whole has never quite equaled the level of personal consideration and quality that the Corps had before.

Q: So the idea-taking personnel functions away from the branch chiefs-often is associated with part of the McNamara reforms, but the idea was around before that, really, you're saying?

A: That's right. By 1958, the Army was told to get smaller. We had a lot of heart-rending problems. I recall one colonel at the port ready to go overseas with his family. I had to call him on the phone and tell him that he was not to move because he had been selected out of the Army. You know, these were tough personal things. Many people were caught with one foot off the ground.

Q: Did this tend to be a little heavier at the higher ranks, at major and above?

A: Well, of course; however, it wasn't quite so painful if the officer was eligible to retire.

Q: Yes.

A: None of the colonels let go were to be generals, and they knew that. Still, it's a big disappointment to those affected.

Q: Did this hit a little higher and not so much at the lieutenant-captain level? Or was there a big reduction there too?

A: No, we tried to keep the lieutenants and captains because we were short in these grades.

Q: So it's that World War II bulge that's some of the problem?

A: **Yes.**

Q: I have just one follow-up question. Did the Chief, General Itschner, take a personal interest in assignments?

A: Yes, and he took a special interest in the War College list and generals' assignments.

Q: In the War College?

A: Yes. In fact, the Chief took an interest in all the assignments. We would have a slating session every year of personnel to fill battalions, the districts, and other important jobs. Mr. Percy would take the colonels and we'd take the lieutenant colonels and we'd match them with job needs.

Then the Chief would have a meeting with his principal staff. We would lay out the personnel division's recommendations, and 95 percent of those would be probably okay. Everybody around the table had a crack at them until finally everything would fall into place and produce an approved list. That's how the assignments were made. So the Chief definitely took an interest, and there were certain key assignments he'd approve personally.

Itschner wanted a bachelor for an aide. We looked also for a fellow who was a good student, good in English, because Itschner was an excellent writer We did, and it turned out to be Don Weiner-t, but contrary to his file he wasn't a bachelor any more. He'd gotten married at Christmas. I believe they let him go. I can't be sure. General Itschner took a much deeper interest than just that case, of course.

I think every Chief took a deep interest in these internal assignments: who was going to be running the personnel business, who was going to be running the operations business, et cetera. Not the generals, but the next level. Sometimes he'd throw us an assignment and say, "We're going to put a colonel in this instead of a general," or, "We're going to put a colonel here who's going to be a general." He'd have those kinds of requirements.

Q: Now, at the general officer level, that was Army, is that right?

A: Yes. The Army's General Officers Branch existed, and the Chief of Engineers had a lot to say about engineer general officers' assignments. I'm sure he had more to say in those days.

Q: Any further thoughts on the personnel assignments?

A: The one thing about the personnel assignment is that the job gave me the opportunity to meet so many of the Corps' officers and their families and also to participate with people who were going to be future principals in the Corps.

I also learned that probably the worst person to plan a career is the individual himself. His future is better managed by others. It's sort of like a lawyer defending himself in court. He's got a fool for a client.

Q: How did your next assignment come about? In May 1960.

A: I think I mentioned the fact that I had nothing to do with developing the senior school list. Even so, I knew I had been recommended to go when I finished my duties in the military personnel office. When that list came back from the Chief of Engineers' office or elsewhere, my name was off the list with the comment that, "Before he goes to War College, Morris should get a battalion."

That was probably right because I hadn't commanded troops since 1945 in World War II. As mentioned earlier, Dick Hennessy, who was assigning personnel when I went to Goose Bay, Labrador, had planned for me to go to a battalion in 1.955. Instead, I went to Labrador for two and then OCE for three years. So the time lag for my getting back to troops was extensive, and deciding that I should get a battalion before I went to War College was proper.

I was assigned to the 13th Engineer Battalion of the 7th Division in Korea. While en route overseas, I learned that my assignment had been changed from the 7th Division to the 1 st Cavalry Division, 8th Engineer Battalion. That was quite a surprise because the 1st Cav Division was the first tactical unit south of the DMZ [demilitarized zone].

I hadn't been with troops for so long that I remember telling somebody I probably wouldn't know a soldier if I saw one. Still, I was going to the most active engineer battalion in the Army at that time. I arrived about the 1st of May and found that my predecessor had been reassigned and the acting battalion commander was a Major [William] Curry. I had a good opportunity to make

improvements. We were near the village of Tonga-ri, south of Munsan-ni, on the west side of the peninsula. Our battalion area was supplied water from two large storage tanks at the top of a hill. Those tanks with the false work looked like a castle, and I noticed when I arrived that it was a pretty disreputable looking castle. It needed painting, timbers were loose and so forth. It gave me the idea that maybe our battalion wasn't in too good a shape. We had an officers call that first day, and at the end of my introductions to the battalion officers and senior noncommissioned officers, I said, "Let's get that castle out there fixed up and painted."

Everybody cheered. I didn't really understand what had happened until I found out that my predecessor had said that they were not to spend time or effort on such things as painting and superficial caretaking. Well, to me, the castle on the hill was a little more than just superficial. It symbolized our branch and unit and it either should have been repaired or removed. There's nothing worse than bad advertisement. Anyhow, that got me off to a very good start with the members of the battalion.

I had a fine staff of conscientious, hard-working officers. There were three majors-battalion executive, S-4, and S-3-and six very good company commanders, all regular officers except headquarters company commander. The ROCID [Reorganization of Combat Infantry Division] at that time had five battle groups, each with an engineer company in support. They were spread from the north of the Imjin River right up against the DMZ, southward a distance of some 10 or 15 miles and across the division front.

In about a week I announced an objective for my term. I wanted to get the battalion back to being a combat battalion instead of being laden with miscellaneous construction missions, extra equipment, and numerous higher-echelon maintenance requirements. I went to see the division commander and proposed that we should stop making asphalt, stop heavy construction, and concentrate on getting the battalion back to being a combat battalion supportive of the division. "That's what I want to do during my year here."

I didn't know if he was going to like it or not because the division people wanted engineers doing various kinds of work, but I pointed out that there were other engineers in the theater for such missions. His response was, "Fine, go ahead." So I did. That was what we spent our year doing. The battalion was trimmed and trained to be a proper divisional combat battalion. It gave good support to its battle groups and to the division, and the division commander appreciated it. When my term was over, I was one of two officers to get a commendation medal. Today, it doesn't seem like a great reward, but in those days and since there were only two battalion commanders selected, it was quite a compliment.

So that was the big picture. Let's take a look at some of the specifics that occurred and the people.

We had an excellent group of soldiers and officers. One of our first sergeants was Sergeant [Leon L.] Van Autreve, who later became Command Sergeant Major of the Army. I would run into him again in Vietnam. All the 8th Engineer first sergeants that made it to Vietnam became command sergeant majors. One, Command Sergeant Major Bush, became my second command sergeant major in the 18th Brigade in Vietnam.

The officers included at least four graduates of the Military Academy, all of whom did very well in the Army later. At least two became general officers. One in particular was John Moellering, a new second lieutenant. I was his first battalion commander. John later became the commandant at the Military Academy. He ultimately became the youngest lieutenant general in the Army and retired from the office of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Besides the outstanding people, there were events that made marks in my memory. First, of course, was the operation of the 1st Cavalry Division. Our commanding general was Major General Charles Dodge, an excellent division commander with a lot of esprit and good leadership. He taught all of us. His deputy commander, [Major] General Frank Britton, succeeded him about halfway through my tour. The battle group commanders were also quite outstanding.

Bill Blakefield commanded the 7th Cav and later became a general officer. I remember going to see him one day. He had a picture of Custer's Last Stand behind his desk. I asked him why he had that picture up there. He said, "Well, I have to be reminded that the 7th Cav can't win them all."

The purpose of my visit to Blakefield was to announce that I was going to put Second Lieutenant Moellering in charge of preparing a site for a TOW [tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided] missile demonstration for the president of South Korea. The 7th Cavalry had the mission to arrange the demonstration on a hilltop somewhere in the division area of operation. Blakefield thought that a second lieutenant was probably not up to this responsible job involving the president of Korea. I convinced Blakefield that he could depend on Moellering. He conceded, at least, to let me try, with the promise that I'd keep my eye on it. Of course John did an outstanding job. I think Moellering was probably the best second lieutenant I saw in my whole career in the Army, and that particular assignment was his first major challenge.

The company commander of A Company was first Captain [Freeman] Cross followed by Wayne Hoey, both of whom show up later in my duties. The company commander of C Company was Bob Tener, a West Point graduate, as was Cross. Tener later became the executive to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works and district engineer in Nashville. Jim Miller, the commander of E Company, was also a West Point graduate whose last tour of duty was also on the Army staff as executive to the Secretary of the Army. My battalion executive was Major Hawthorne, an excellent soldier and perfect for his duties.

I finally quit smoking cigarettes 8 August 1960, the day that I woke up to find that I'd smoked a carton of cigarettes in three days.

In late November I began to feel bad in the evenings. I found out later it was hepatitis, and the doctor put me in the hospital the 31st of December, New Year's Eve. I had already arranged a battalion commanders' New Year's Day reception. The officers enjoyed the affair and showed up at my hospital bed later on New Year's Day. Each had a plastic cork from a champagne bottle on his little finger. They wanted to wish me a Happy New Year. I appreciated the gesture but I doubt it made me feel much better. I was the senior patient so I had a private room even in a MASH hospital. There was a ward full of hepatitis patients across the corridor. Hepatitis patients were not allowed to work. They had to stay in bed, eat a lot of high-caloric food, and gain weight as a result.

I was discharged on the 15th of February 196 1 and on a strict, nonalcoholic and controlled caloric diet until I could get my weight down. By 15 May I had lost 45 pounds and the doctor told me I could drink alcohol if I wished. I wasn't happy with my weight so I decided to wait another month. I put a notice in the daily bulletin that 15 June would be "M-Day."

About the 1 st of June I announced an officers call for the 15th of June without any agenda. All the officers were curious until the officers call when I told them M-Day stood for "Morris's Martinis Day." Martinis were on me; anything else they'd have to pay.

As it turned out, we got to bed quite late that night. That M-Day was the beginning of a tradition. Henceforth 15 June would be the day the battalion commander of the 8th Engineer Battalion bought all of his officers martinis. When I got to Vietnam eight years later, it was still going on.

That's how traditions get started, but it's really not the end of the story because, as luck would have it, the division called an alert at 0400 on 16 June. This meant that we had to be combat-loaded and moving our vehicles out of the compound within two hours. Well, the 8th Engineers normally could do that in about 30 or 40 minutes. On this particular morning everybody was slow to rise and slower to function. About 0500 the division CG [commanding general] called for a report, and I told him we were going to be ready within the allotted two hours. After a few minutes General Britton showed up and wanted to know just what was the problem. So I explained the whole scenario. He thought that was kind of humorous. Fortunately, we did make it within two hours and got off the hook as far as the division commander was concerned.

At any rate, a small case of hepatitis ended with the initiation of a tradition.

The battalion's duties need to be discussed further. We did a lot of training, of course, to keep ourselves sharp. Our engineer companies accompanied their battle groups on maneuvers-training exercises. The division also had training exercises as did the battalion. I moved the whole battalion to the field several times, which was an innovation to that group, and then we had the separate battalion missions, of course, such as airfield and road work and our equipment readiness program. We removed several active minefields. This was a little hairy since these Korean War minefields had been in place for years. We had only one accident and that because a soldier violated the rules for entering and leaving the minefield.

The engineer battalion was issued three combat engineer vehicles [CEVs-Sherman tanks with a mounted 'dozer blade. The crews consequently participated in the division armored firing exercises. Our Sergeant Garcia placed first in the 1st Cav Division firings, much to our glee and the armored unit's dismay.

We accomplished our initial goal of bringing the battalion to a solid footing as a divisional battalion. We gave the division good support, and we steadily improved team performance in executing a divisional combat battalion's mission.

One personal lesson learned emphasized that communications are so important, particularly when non-Americans were working in conjunction with us. Our water supply was taken from a nearby creek, treated, and pumped up to the tanks that I mentioned earlier, and gravity fed to the camp. Cold weather presented certain problems. The piping was not insulated, and to avoid freezing the water in the lines required frequent pumping.

One frigid evening I went to the water point and explained to the soldier on duty that we had to run water through those lines for ten minutes every hour so the lines wouldn't freeze. He did exactly what I told him. The only problem was that ten minutes every hour was not enough to fill the tanks, so while the lines didn't freeze, we ran out of water the next midday. The lesson was communications. He did what I told him, but I thought I was telling him something else.

Nevertheless, that etched in my mind the thought that if somebody misunderstands or doesn't do what is asked, the odds are that the problem is with the sender, not with the receiver. So I couldn't, in good conscience, blame this soldier for letting the camp run out of water. I really could only blame myself because my instructions had not been sufficiently clear.

Our battalion didn't have a chaplain because the division was short of chaplains. We were getting some help from the divisional chaplain, but it wasn't very satisfactory. I finally arranged with the Baptist Mission in Seoul to send us a minister, and he turned out to be truly outstanding. We had few soldiers and only a very small number of attendees at church until he arrived, but in short order the chapel was full. The value of religious services and of religion to soldiers when they're far away from home became evident.

Our battalion supported the Pak–Ai Orphanage of some 60 children of varying ages between 5 and 10 or 12. About 20 children were taught to sing a cappella by their leader, and every Sunday these children would be our choir for the church services. Their voices were exceptionally beautiful. So with the fine minister and with this choir, our church services became well known throughout the 1st Cavalry Division. Our Sundays became special events to the officers and men of the battalion. A poor situation soon became a real winner.

In the March 1960 time frame, two things happened. One, I was selected to attend the Army War College and also for promotion to colonel. This early promotion, even after seven years as a lieutenant colonel, jumped me ahead of the large hump of lieutenant colonels with a 7 July 195 1 date of rank.

Also, I was able to make plans for my family's next move. I stayed in Korea just 13 months and was back in the USA by 1 June 1961. The day I left, I was flown to Kimpo Air Base in the battalion commander's helicopter, an H-13. On leaving we circled around the deck off the officers' club where all the people were standing, waving goodbye.

Q: May I interrupt you with just a couple of follow-up questions. You described how the 8th Engineer Battalion had gotten much equipment left that wasn't part of the TO&E [table of organization and equipment]. Was that, in your experience, fairly common? Does a divisional battalion, if it's in a place for a while, does it become a lot like a construction battalion?

A: I'd say the answer to your question is no, it's not too typical. When you realize that numerous wartime units in Korea had been returned to the States, a lot of equipment left behind would be picked up by the units which remained.

Our situation was one of inheriting the stuff from some other place, and there were many things the engineers could do for the people in the division. The resulting problem was the battalion wasn't doing what it was supposed to be doing. The 44th Engineer Construction Battalion was there, and we also had the 36th Engineer Group for corps support. The commanding officer of the 36th Engineer Group was then Colonel Dave Parker, the same Colonel Parker I had met in Tokyo at the end of World War II.

Dave replaced Bob Mathe, my classmate. The corps engineer was Colonel Roy Dodge. The Eighth Army engineer was Colonel Duncan Hallock, and one of his assistants was Colonel Don Eister, who had been with me in Tokyo. I mentioned him earlier. He killed himself in Korea. That was sad, too, because I liked Don very much.

Q: Did you feel that you had, as division engineer, good access to the division commander?

A: Yes. The engineer battalion was important to General Dodge and also to General Britton. The signal battalion was important also. You have to understand we had a unique situation. The five-battle group pentomic division only lasted a short while, but it aligned an engineer company with each battle group. The battle groups were relatively small and widely dispersed, so the engineer companies were important.

I saw the division CG at least once a week at his staff briefings. Also, I had an assistant division engineer at division headquarters. The assistant division engineer in the 1st Cavalry Division for part of that time was Captain Miller, earlier commander of Company E. He lived at division headquarters; I was some miles away from division headquarters with the battalion.

Whenever an important issue came up, Miller would call me, and if appropriate I'd go over and see the division commander. I tried to see the division commander one-on-one every couple of weeks, and if he didn't call me over there, I'd go see him. Yes, it was a good relationship.

Q: Now, you may have mentioned this earlier. This was the pentomic division organization?

A: That's what they called it.

Q: Yes, the five battle groups. Your early promotion to colonel—the division commander must have had a role.

A: My efficiency reports probably looked pretty good after the three years there in personnel. I mean, I look upon that personnel job as one where I didn't really have an opportunity to fail.

You recall I mentioned my exit from Goose Air Base, that the base commander and the Air Force general wrote a glowing report about me because he wanted to prove a point. So I had a good file before I arrived at the 8th Engineers. By the time the board met, probably I had at least one efficiency report from the division commander, and once my record showed battalion command, the prerequisites of being selected for colonel were met. The rest of it was whether the board thought my overall record deserved promotion. I'm very happy they did because, you see, by the time I actually made colonel, full colonel, I'd been a lieutenant colonel eight years. I made lieutenant colonel in 1953 and full colonel in 1961.

Q: It strikes me that the personnel officer assignment, the down side of that is that it's a job that requires diplomatic skills. I mean, it does strike me that you could make enemies.

A: Well, you're right. To be good in that job you have to try to understand people and put a lot of thought into how the other guy feels about things. Diplomatic may not be the best word, but in any event, you have to be compassionate, not that you have to feel sorry for people. You've got to understand their family situation—to evaluate if the assignment will be adverse or whether it's going to make them happy or unhappy. I don't mean necessarily that you never do things that make people unhappy. You'd rather not, but sometimes you can't avoid it, in which case the way you handle the situation makes a lot of difference in its acceptance. So you're right. With the wrong approach you can make enemies in that job, no doubt about that.

Q: Moving back to Korea, where you were—the 1st Cav was up on the border at the DMZ. Were there incidents when you were there?

A: Yes, there was always something going on but nothing as serious as happened a few years later. At Panmunjom, where the North and South met to discuss various treaty matters, we built blocking positions and fortifications on strong points for the defense of the area. We repaired bridges and erected floating bridges in the Imjin River.

We could go into the DMZ for various reasons including reconnaissance to look for indications of any unusual activities.

Q: Being assigned to a battalion on the front lines in 1960 was certainly a good assignment.

A: It was an excellent experience. It truly was. I'm very proud of having been in the 1st Cavalry Division. It is a division that makes me proud. I guess all the people feel that way about their divisions; I do particularly. When I'm in uniform, I always wear the 1st Cav patch on the right sleeve, and I belong to 1st Cav Association. I think in those days the officers who went to the 1st Cav Division were well selected. We had quality people.

Q: So you were promoted to colonel then and came back to the Army War College in the summer of 1961?

A: Yes. When I went to Korea I left my family in North Carolina. We'd been living in Arlington in a nice home there, but my tour in Korea provided a good time for Gerry to go home where her parents and sister were living. I felt better about it because she wouldn't be quite so alone.

We left behind in Virginia two very good friends; one was Dick Connell and his wife Betsy and Jim and Laura Bunch. Jim was from Oklahoma and had been at Goose Bay with me. He, Laura, and his two daughters became and still remain among our closest friends. Bunch returned to OCE some years later to run the personnel program. Connell also returned as a brigadier general to head military construction while I was Chief of Engineers.

Anyhow, I returned to North Carolina from Korea to gather the family. During the short stay Susan was hit by an automobile and John broke his foot on his new bicycle, so we limped off to Carlisle with our dog and two wounded children. Both recovered nicely, fortunately. I was senior enough to get quarters at Carlisle Barracks and was assigned a nice cottage in College Arms. Small but satisfactory. Carlisle is truly a very pleasant environment, and you meet not only the top people from other branches of the Army, but also key individuals from other services and the State Department.

As I said, life at Carlisle was very nice, particularly for the family following the year's separation. Our daughter got into the horse business and our young son was busy finding out what school was all about. We were in the middle of the antique country, so we got into refinishing furniture.

Of course, I was there to learn what makes our military and U.S. government world go round and how the Army and the other service departments work together. We had outstanding guest speakers. The War College is an exceptionally fine educational experience.

The big exercise in my memory was writing a thesis on some broad subject. I chose the Organization of American States. The crunch came in deciding when to do it. My adviser convinced me that getting that thing done before Christmas would make for a happier holiday. Otherwise, I would probably have to spend Christmas writing the paper, which was due in the middle of January, as I recall.

The Vietnam War was warming up. Our deputy commandant was General [William] Train and his son was one of the first officers killed in Vietnam. This was still 1961, 1962. That was an impact event for the students and faculty.

I was actually promoted to colonel in the fall. Gerry and our children helped the commanding general pin on the "eagles."

Another highlight was watching John Glenn orbit the earth. That was singular and outstanding because the space program had quite a bit to do with our educational program. Our State Department resident was John Liddy. The class of 1962 produced many future leaders in all services.

Tulsa District

A: Finally, as the year drew down, the question of my next assignment arose. My classmate Bob Mathe was handling personnel assignments. He called me one day to ask my preferences. I said, "I'd like to be a district engineer, but I think I'll ask for a group, an engineer group, troop assignment."

He asked, "Why are you going to do that?"

I answered, "I think I'm too junior for a busy district, and the only ones I probably could get would be Charleston or Wilmington, and I can't go to Wilmington, my wife's home. That leaves Charleston, so maybe I ought to wait a while and go for a group now."

He indicated that in his opinion I ought to go for a district.

Well, the next thing I knew, I was going to Tulsa, the largest civil works district in the Corps, and I would be the junior district engineer. The Chief of Engineers then was General Wilson, and from my own experience I think this is how the assignment evolved. I don't know if I mentioned it or not, but I saw a lot of General Wilson when I was in Goose Bay and also in Savannah earlier.

Q: He was in the North Atlantic Division?

A: He was in charge of military construction in OCE while I was in the North Atlantic Division.

Q: Military construction?

A: Yes, I pulled quite a boner with General Wilson in Goose Bay. When he came to Goose, Gerry and I had him to our house for cocktails. I handed out some of those napkins with humorous sayings on them. After he went home I went around to help Gerry clean up and I noticed the one we gave him said, "Killjoy was here."

That wasn't such a good idea at the time, but I'm sure he remembered me when he became Chief of Engineers. Anyhow, my understanding is that when the post-War College assignments came around to General Wilson, he set my name aside for a bit. Finally, they plugged everybody else in the holes and two things were left over, Tulsa District and me. So the Chief took a chance and put us together. That's sometimes the way it is. Besides, it makes a good story. Some years later, General [William] Cassidy told me he was sure Tulsa would be a "make or break" test.

In any case, I drew Tulsa. When I came home that day and told Gerry that we were going to Tulsa, she said, "Well, you can go by yourself. I'm not going." Being a beach lover, she didn't think much of going out to Oklahoma. The kids were excited about it and she, of course, went.

We left Carlisle about the 1st of June and got to Oklahoma a few weeks later. Colonel Howard Penney [later lieutenant general] was the departing district engineer en route to Vietnam. I had not met Howard, although I knew of him. He gave me a good briefing and I settled into the job and we soon bought a house.

The people of Oklahoma were just great and we started off in a very, very fine atmosphere. To buy the house I needed a loan. I'd met the president of the bank, a retired colonel and very patriotic. Because the Corps of Engineers in Tulsa, Oklahoma, was an important and respected military and public service organization, district engineers were well known and respected. As I was getting ready to go through the necessary loan forms, collateral and everything, the bank president came by and turned to his employee and said, "Don't worry about all that; just give him the loan." You know, that's kind of neat when you think about it.

So we bought this new house out at 5219 Joplin Street. Dave Helms, who helped me find the house, called it 51st and plowed ground. Our neighbor was an American Indian family on their ranch. Their horses would come up to our fence, and John and Susan would feed them carrots. Today our place is almost downtown, as Tulsa has grown so much in that direction.

Thus began our first tour in charge of a major civil works program. We'd been in Savannah, but in Tulsa I was in charge. Senator [Robert S.] Kerr was still living. General Cassidy was Deputy Chief of Engineers, and sent me off to Tulsa with some good advice. He indicated Tulsa was a very important district, that Senator Kerr was very much involved in the public works program as the chairman of the Senate committee. He wanted me to keep him posted on Senator Kerr and to be responsive to the senator's needs and so forth.

I asked if that meant anything out of the ordinary, and General Cassidy asked me to just remember that Senator Kerr was important to the water program, to the Chief, and to the Corps.

Senator Kerr's assistant was Don McBride, a truly outstanding public servant. He worked with Senator Kerr all the time the senator was in Washington. The senator died, 1 January 1963, and McBride stayed on with Senator [Mike] Monroney, who became the senior senator from Oklahoma. Later, McBride was appointed director of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Don and I quickly became and stayed very close. Later, if I ever had a problem, even as Chief, I could always go to Don and get good, solid political advice. I have diverted here a little bit, but that was the beginning of a very important relationship. He was a great teacher of how to do things in the right way politically.

The Tulsa District boundaries included the drainage of the Arkansas and Red Rivers as far east as the Arkansas state line. This meant parts of Colorado, New Mexico, Kansas, the northern tier of Texas, and all of Oklahoma were included. The annual workload was $100 million and the district staff was approximately 1,200. Tulsa had no military construction.

Howard Penney probably was the best staff officer I've ever known and an excellent planner. Howard devoted much of his tour to propelling the projects through the planning into the authorization stage. In those days there were a lot of projects. I recall being involved with the construction of 26 dams, mostly Howard Penney's projects. That's more than the entire Corps has built in many recent years.

Howard's emphasis on planning meant that the construction side of the house had built up a backlog of disputes. The district engineer as contracting officer had to take care of these disputes, and that became my first objective. I didn't want to interfere with the planning process, but I felt that we had to get rid of some of those disputes. Work was being delayed and we weren't getting enough bidders on the jobs. One reason was they couldn't get their money while changes were tied up in disputes, et cetera.

I had learned in Goose Bay that the government's and the public's interests are best served if the contractor and the contracting officer adopt a mutual philosophy of getting the work done. We set up a program to eliminate and also to avoid disputes. Three years later we did not have a single outstanding claim. In this process I believe that we gave the contractors nothing beyond what they deserved. On the other hand, I am absolutely certain that we saved the taxpayers money because we just didn't have the delays and the hang-ups which delayed needed projects from becoming productive. Besides that, instead of having one and two bidders on a job, we were beginning to get 10 and 15, and our prices were much better. Also important, we generated an enthusiasm to produce. The morale of the construction industry in the Tulsa District area became very good.

Of course, internally our morale was also high because we had a great program. I mean, it was not a matter of the district wanting something to do. It was a matter of managing it so we did it well while accommodating all this work.

A few months into the tour, the Waurika Dam on Beaver Creek became a major event and challenge. Waurika, Oklahoma, was the site of a Bureau of Reclamation project in the final preauthorization stage. To show you Senator Kerr's power—without going into all the political background—there was a congressman from Texas whose district possessed a dam site on another stream which came out of the panhandle of Texas into Oklahoma. There was also a dam site just inside Oklahoma.

As I understand it, the Texas congressman was on the Interior Committee and threatened to pigeonhole Waurika unless Senator Kerr supported the development of his dam site in Texas. Kerr refused and had the project taken out of the Bureau of Reclamation's authorization package and put into the Corps of Engineers' program. General Cassidy had forewarned me this might happen. On 20 November 1962, I was told I had to have a survey report in Washington within 30

days, and I told General Cassidy, "It's going to be tough." His reaction was for me to get a report to OCE somehow by 20 December to meet the authorization process schedule.

So we went to the regional office of the Bureau of Reclamation in Oklahoma City. Fortunately, Mr. Barkley, the head of that office, knew what had happened, and when I asked to start with his survey report, he reached in the file drawer and he gave it to me.

Myron DeGeer was the number two man in the engineering division at that time. The chief of engineering was Mel Parse, who was preparing to retire. So Myron DeGeer was the real engineer on Waurika. DeGeer and I took that report back to Tulsa. He ripped the Bureau cover off of it and began to study it. I mentioned the need of a public hearing. He said, "You've got to have a public hearing."

So right away we put out a two-week notice for a public hearing in Waurika High School, advised Senator Kerr's office and Don McBride, and asked for their help. I remember mentioning to Senator Kerr one day that we are going to have a problem in Waurika because I didn't know any of those people and they didn't know the Corps; they knew the Bureau.

He said, "Colonel, when I get through with this, they'll love you like a brother."

On the day of the hearing, the schoolhouse was full of people. I couldn't believe it. Senator Kerr had had the schools let out; all the townspeople had come to see "Democracy in Action." We started off about 10 o'clock in the morning. I went through the normal presentations and showed pictures of the floods and the damage the dam would control plus land requirements and other things. About 12 noon things had gone rather well, so we decided to take a break for lunch.

As I was looking at the maps, thinking through the next session to begin after lunch, somebody put his arm around my shoulder. I looked up and it was Senator Kerr. He wanted to know if I wanted to build this dam or let the Bureau of Reclamation build it.

My response was easy. "Sir, after all the trouble I've gone through in the last three weeks, if we get this thing authorized, I sure want to build it."

He said, "Okay, it's yours."

That's what happened. It's unbelievable, but it happened. I was gone from Tulsa when the dam was finished, but I did go back for the dedication. Congressman Carl Albert was there. He was the Speaker of the House at the time. He told some of these stories about the Waurika project.

I went to Wichita, Kansas, during the first six months I was the district engineer. Senator Kerr was to make a speech on the Arkansas River project being built by Tulsa. The river goes on to Wichita, and the gleam in the eye of people at Wichita was to get navigation extended up there.

Senator [Frank] Carlson, a Republican and the senior senator from Kansas, introduced Senator Kerr as a great "Republican" from the state of Oklahoma. Democrat Kerr, a 110 percent Democrat, brushed that off and then made this speech about a third of Kansas, including Wichita, being in the Tulsa District and the importance of water resource development. He closed by admonishing the group to, "Be careful what you dream because it might come true." I thought that was a great statement. Finally, he had them stand and sing "Shall We Gather by the River." You learn about and feel inspiring leadership by being associated with someone of that stature.

Gerry and I were having an open house the 1 st of January 1963 for the district people. We were stunned when we learned that Robert S. Kerr had died the same day. All at the reception knew that with Kerr gone, there was to be a different day ahead. In the Tulsa region he was the leader of a group of the most powerful water resource people of our time: Senator [John] McClellan,

Arkansas; Senator ILyndon] Johnson, Texas; Senator [Allen] Ellender, Louisiana; Senator [J. William] Fulbright, Arkansas; Senator Carlson, Kansas; and others.

The congressional group included Jim Wright, Texas; Ed Edmonson and Carl Albert, Oklahoma; Wilbur Mills, Arkansas; plus the remainder of the Oklahoma delegation. Insofar as the public works program was concerned, that group formed a political powerhouse.

Don McBride saw the problems and the opportunities, and Kerr provided the essential leadership for solutions and progress. I was able to learn so much about the political arena from them.

Senator Kerr's funeral was held in Oklahoma City, and General Wilson, the Chief of Engineers, came. Ultimately and properly, the Arkansas River project was named the McClellan-Kerr navigation project.

Because of the major and continuous public involvement as part of our work, an active public relations program was essential. Locklin L. Mouton, from Albuquerque, came to Tulsa with his wife, Inez, about the same time as Gerry and I. Locke and I became very close. Donna, his assistant, a GS-2, helped Locke start a public relations program that had high visibility and was driven to keep the public fully informed on the Corps' activities. Donna was outstandingly capable and in time moved up to the top administrative position in the district.

The Arkansas Basin Development Association [ABDA] was the energetic organizing and lobbying group that testified in support of the congressional legislation that supported projects in Arkansas and Oklahoma. The director was Colonel [retired] Francis Wilson. He was a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and former Tulsa District engineer. He was called "Babe" Wilson because he was forever young looking, and he helped me tremendously.

When I first came to Tulsa, he, Early Cass, Glade Kirkpatrick, Charles Gannaway, Versur Hicks, and some other ABDA leaders had me to the Tulsa Club for lunch and gave their time to bring me into the picture and get to know them and their concerns. From the first days, the national and local power structure became quite clear, much to my advantage. We impacted the public so much that it was crucial that I knew the issues and executed an effective public information program. The ABDA was invaluable.

On reflection, the two things that we undertook initially were to get our construction program in high gear and to implement a positive plan to deal with the public based on an understanding of local and national leadership issues.

To keep everyone in the district aware of what we were to do, I issued district goals and objectives and had classes to discuss how to go about the business of reaching them. The list included cost control by project with special attention to overhead costs. I was not the only one watching the cost data, I soon learned.

General Carroll Dunn, the Southwest Division engineer, called to tell me he was to come see me in late August or early September. General Dunn came and immediately said, "Morris, you've done some good things in the short while you've been here, but you've got one real problem that you've got to solve, and I mean right away. Your overhead's too high!"

I indicated I knew it and explained what we had done and were doing about it. I knew what was wrong, but I had not made a point of telling General Dunn that this was a problem that we were going to solve. So an old lesson was relearned. If you've got a problem, the best thing to do with it is put it out in the open and tell the boss what is being done to fix it, rather than waiting for him to find it.

General Dunn was the division engineer most of my tour. [Brigadier] General [Richard H.] Free replaced him later.

On 22 November 1963, I was in my car with a couple of people from the district, looking at the Keystone project area. We went into a little restaurant in Cleveland, Oklahoma, and everybody was crying. We were laughing and joking, and one of the waitresses said, "Why are you all so happy? I guess you haven't heard the news."

We said, "What news?" They then told us that President Kennedy had been shot in Dallas.

The first appearance of President [Lyndon] Johnson in the Southwest after the assassination was in Tulsa District to dedicate Eufaula Dam. Earlier, President [John F.] Kennedy had dedicated Greers Ferry Dam in Arkansas. I attended and observed the arrangements made for that event. We used the Greers Ferry scenario as a guide to dedicate Eufaula. Security was a big issue, of course. We arranged a plan, which to me was quite safe, and everything was all set when the advance team came. Jack Valenti was in charge. He's now president of the Motion Picture Association. He said, "We can't do it this way." This was only a few days before the event. President Johnson wanted to meet and shake hands and be close to the people and so forth. So we had to change everything.

Jack Valenti also asked, "How many people are you going to have?" The Eufaula Dam was really out in the country. When I indicated 30,000 or 40,000, he said, "Where in the world are they coming from?"

I said, "They'll be here from Tulsa, McAllister, and other places." Valenti couldn't believe we could get 30,000 people for the president.

The event started at 9 o'clock in the morning. We had Indian dancing and continuous events, plus food, refreshments, et cetera. The people started coming. I never saw so many people in Oklahoma at one place. I'm telling you, it was a lot of people.

Governor Henry Bellmon came and started the program at 12:00 noon. The president was coming from some other event and was behind schedule. So we did everything on the schedule up to Governor Bellmon's introduction of the president. Then we stopped, took a break. When the president came, we picked it up again. I met the president as his motorcade came into the area. We had it fenced off with only a little avenue to get up to the bleachers. On the left side there was a full-sized roadside billboard titled, "War on Poverty: The Arkansas River Project." The map of the project had all the dams and cities on it for the entire 435 miles.

He got out of the car, and I introduced myself as the district engineer and asked him for a minute so I could tell him about the project. He indicated he didn't have much time because all those people were going to want to say hello. I indicated I wanted him to look at the map of the project, which is a centerpiece in "*your* War on Poverty." That got me two minutes, which is all I wanted.

Then he shook hands all around and he went onto the platform. Fred Harris was running against Bud Wilkinson for the U.S. Senate. Wilkinson was a great football coach and everybody loved him in Oklahoma. President Johnson put his arms around Fred Harris, shook his hand, made a big to-do out of it. He walked by Bud Wilkinson, never even looked at him. Cool as ice, as if he wasn't even there.

The president gave his speech, and we prepared for his departure. The last thing I was told by the Secret Service was, "When you come back, Colonel, don't get in the wrong car. Don't get in Mrs. [Lady Bird] Johnson's car." Well, I did. They had to get me out of there. That was a little embarrassing.

President Lyndon B. Johnson dedicated the Eufaula Reservoir on September 25, 1964, while Colonel John W. Morris was District Engineer of the Tulsa District.

Later, we prepared an SOP [standing operating procedure] on presidential dedications, and the Chief's office used it as a guide for quite a while. That may have been the only SOP anybody had written on how to handle a presidential dedication. Ours was very successful; we had 45,000 people.

That pretty much takes care of the first one and a half years, and the thread through all this, though, was finishing the Arkansas project. The political consortium, which really was coalesced by the efforts of Don McBride, was successful in getting President Johnson to increase the budget on one project in the whole public works program, the Arkansas River project.

There wasn't a great deal of money added. It was like $11 million or $15 million, but it was critical to staying on schedule. General Dunn required Charlie-Colonel Maynard, who was the district engineer in Little Rock-and me to almost swear that we would use the money if we got it. He was willing to go for the money but had to use it properly. I had the upper half and Maynard had the lower half of this project. His portion was a couple of years ahead in construction. Charlie and I had been to War College together so we knew each other well and we'd taken our jobs at the same time. He was an excellent partner on this major project.

As I have said, Dave Helms was probably the best real estate man in the entire Corps. If we had money that couldn't be committed to construction, he could use it to acquire land necessary for the project. We were going along fairly well when Charlie Maynard called and said he could not commit all of his money and asked if I could use about $7 million. I said, "Yes." He offered to ask General Dunn if he would give Tulsa the $7 million.

After some discussion I suggested that to keep the boss from being too upset, he let me tell Dunn I had to have $7 million. When the boss asks you for it, you can say okay, but very reluctantly. That's what happened. So it worked out just fine. We used the $7 million. Charlie was **a** great, generous friend.

While the Arkansas River project was the centerpiece, we had other dams and projects, including the extension of the project to Wichita and to Oklahoma City. We spent a lot of time on those two. We figured out how to get to Wichita. Because the top portion of the navigation channel to Tulsa uses the Verdigris, not the Arkansas, we had to jump back into the Arkansas or use some other way to Wichita.

Then there was the project to extend navigation to OkIahoma City, the Central Oklahoma project. It was to be a pump-back facility to conserve water. I came to Washington to present it to the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors. The Kaskaskia navigation project in Illinois was also presented by the district engineer of Rock Island, as I recall. The board and the Chief of Engineers elected to recommend only the Kaskaskia. The Kaskaskia was built. The Central Oklahoma project never made it, although Arcadia Dam, a feature of the project, is in place today.

Q: Might that have been a project that Senator Kerr's death was critical to?

A: If he'd lived, I believe he'd have gotten it authorized. The project was totally within the confines of the state of Oklahoma. Since so much attention had gone to the Arkansas River project, not many states were willing to give Oklahoma another major project right away. That was a political fact of life. It was a good project and should have been built.

Concurrent with that was the salt study. Salt beds ran through southern Kansas and into Oklahoma and Texas. Fresh water would run through them and become polluted. As a result, the Arkansas River at Tulsa is unusable for many purposes because of its salinity. Great quantities of good water could have been obtained by diverting the fresh runoff and streams around these salt beds, and, in some cases, impounding already polluted water to keep it away from fresh sources.

The Red River had the same type of problem and, as far east as Lake Texhoma, was too saline to be used for industrial purposes. The region included Dallas. The Red River project and the Arkansas project were combined into a single program. That was probably a mistake. This was, and remains, one of the best projects in our country, but we could never get it clearly authorized and funded. The Red River portion did proceed, in part, primarily because Congressman Carl Albert was able to have specific sites corrected. I would expect the Red River water now is probably pretty fresh. I thought we had a real winner and pushed hard within the Corps while Governor and later Senator Bellmon worked hard outside and in Congress. Even so, the project did not go, I regret to say. Ironically, if man had created the pollution, correction would have been mandatory. Since nature created the situation, man was not allowed to fix it.

The Little River system, a tributary to the Red River, included a series of dams which run parallel to the Red from an east-to-west direction. There was Broken Bow, Gillham, Dierks, Hugo, Pine Creek, and DeQueen. Of those dams, all were built eventually, but Gillham became a centerpiece later, several years later, in the environmental program. In fact, it was stopped for a while for

environmental reasons. That was long after I'd left Tulsa. Another major disappointment occurred when the Pine Creek Dam was lowered to delete hydropower because oil prices had dropped temporarily. I believed then and remain convinced that the criteria were shortsighted when hydropower was excluded permanently from sites that had the natural features to support power.

Throughout the district area there were approximately a dozen other individual projects. So the program included the Arkansas project, the Central Oklahoma project, the salt study, both the Red and Arkansas, the Little River projects, and a significant group of miscellaneous projects.

While all that planning was going on, we were actually building, as I recall, something like 25 or 26 dams.

Q: Were any of them particularly problematic projects?

A: I mentioned Central Oklahoma and the salt study. I didn't mention the Grand River drainage. The Grand River is an anomaly. The Grand River Dam Authority is a state operation. Fort Gibson was a Corps project and it was the southernmost dam in the series. All the upstream dams had flood control and hydropower. The Corps regulated the flood control for the entire system through Fort Gibson. We worked closely with the Grand River Dam Authority.

One interesting event occurred. Pensacola was a Grand River Dam Authority project being prepared for construction in 1962. The Corps reviewed the flood control and other aspects of the plan. As I looked it over, I thought, "This project seems familiar." I realized shortly that when I was at the University of Iowa many years earlier, I had been given a problem to design the dam and spillway for a project. It turned out that the Pensacola was that dam. I compared my spillway to the one they were building and was happy to learn that their spillway was less than one foot higher than mine.

Some of the most important activities were the public hearings on these projects. The real estate hearings were always delicate. I did all hearings personally-at least ten a year. Sometimes we'd have three or four hearings for the same project, particularly in real estate. I learned early the value and sometimes the difficulty of communicating with the audience. The public attendees included farmers and ranchers who didn't always understand technical data. In many cases we had to get down to each person and his property. I would always make a reconnaissance throughout the proposed reservoir area of a new project. I would then be able to speak with knowledge about individual property and so forth. Public hearings were hard but essential work.

A project called Boswell Dam near Atoka, in Carl Albert's district, was interesting. Mr. Albert had said that as long as he was in Congress, we would never build Boswell Dam. It was probably one of the best dam sites in the United States and was needed for water supply to Oklahoma City, but his constituents objected, and he never let it get built. However, we did have the public hearings in Atoka, which I remember well-a very hostile group. During the noon break one elderly lady in the audience stopped me and said, "I don't understand why you come out here and take our land away from us." She then explained that she had come in a covered wagon with her family many years ago.

I asked to be excused, and as I began to move away, she started tapping me with her cane. Then I said, "Ma'am, I'm sorry to tell you this, but I just have to go to the bathroom."

She said, "Well, that's one place I won't follow you."

During the same hearing one man became very obnoxious. Fortunately on my drive around the reservoir the day before, I had gone by his place and actually seen this same man sitting on his porch in a rocking chair with his feet propped up on the porch post. When he gave me a hard time about the value of property and so forth, I explained I was by his place the day before and he was

sitting on his front porch in a rocking chair. Well, that did it. Right there the attitude of the meeting became friendly.

Q: Did you introduce any innovative programs while you were district engineer?

A: Yes, value engineering. I believed it had a place, so we had had a group of people from Harbridge House put on a seminar on cost reduction for Tulsa District. That was the beginning that led to the first application of value engineering in the Corps. I became known as the "father of value engineering" in the Corps of Engineers. That may or may not be true, but I know we were certainly one of the early ones. I received a nice letter from General Wilson and later a management award from the president of the United States, President Johnson, for that plus other things.

Also we inaugurated an environmental program of sorts long before the environmental laws. We had begun to realize that our new lakes were public places and should be well kept. We started a beautification program that was very successful. For those project operators who didn't do too well, we gave them a hoe and a shovel at the annual picnic. The others were complimented. That program preceded "Keep America Beautiful."

I felt also that the public should have a safe and pleasant experience at their projects, so we began to erect information signs and to build places and special facilities for handicapped people, long before there was a handicapped program. A study group looked for similar improvements not only for the people but also for fish, wildlife, et cetera.

We insisted that the chief of the Operations Division, Bob Hunter, a Normandy Invasion veteran, be present during construction inspections. I wanted him to discuss with the construction and the engineering people how the building looked in light of his having to operate it. After all, that's what counts. Well, it took a little while, but we managed to integrate operational considerations into engineering and construction planning and execution. This approach was a small example of today's "partnering" between the owner and the engineer and the builder.

Along this line, we soon learned we had to be more selective in appointing project operation managers. The fellow who supervised the construction would often become the project manager when the product became operational. We soon learned that often did not work too well. The reason was simple. Some people can do both, but too often the construction manager's main occupation and concerns dealt with the engineering and construction mentality. The man that operates a project, besides keeping everything working and maintained, has a day-to-day need for meeting and dealing with the public, so he has to have a different philosophy than the builder has.

The growing need to pay considerable attention to the operational phase was not peculiar to Tulsa District. It was a Corpswide requirement as many projects became operational.

Another lesson learned from a highly visible public works program was the impact of personal interaction with the public, both officially and as part of your personal family's lifestyle. Doesn't have to be, but should be. My children, both John and Susan, went to school in the public schools in Oklahoma at Tulsa.

Susan became very much interested in her riding. She worked at a stable with the children of some of the community leaders. I became chairman of the building committee for a new church and served on the Indian Nations Council for the Boy Scouts. We became part of the city of Tulsa, Oklahoma. We were given honorary membership in Southern Hills Country Club, which meant that, although we paid our expenses, we were allowed to use the facilities.

Politically, as district engineer, I frequently visited the governors. Governor Bellmon and I flew a reconnaissance of the whole district area. Besides seeing the governor and the congressmen at least once a year, I was on television frequently, and district activities were in the newspaper constantly.

I don't know how important this is to the interview, but to me, public and community relations are critically important. As part of the salt study, we were considering a dam site near Buffalo, in the panhandle of Oklahoma. I went there one day with Myron DeGeer. The rancher we visited was named Selman, and I have never been so coldly received. I mean, he was very, very distant. Come to find out that he was living out there because the Corps of Engineers had bought out his father for a dam in eastern Oklahoma. His family moved that far to get away from the "damned Corps of Engineers."

Susan Morris became interested in riding while the Morris family lived in Tulsa. She is shown riding "Stormy," a polo pony from the Tulsa Polo Club

As I put my briefcase down on the ground, his dog came over and sprayed it. Selman said, "Colonel, that's what we think of you out here in Buffalo, Oklahoma." Our visit was brief but sufficient to explain our purpose before we were on our way to Hutchinson, Kansas. We were going to go up there to look at another dam site. As we arrived in town there was a big sign in the middle of the street, "Corps of Engineers meeting at 2 o'clock in the schoolhouse." Selman had called ahead. We had not planned a meeting but I was trapped. The schoolhouse was full of people who kept me there until 5:30, asking questions about this project.

Finally, I said to the people, "We better close this off. I am very thirsty and really feel that I'd like to get something cold to drink." Soon thereafter as we're driving out of town we noticed on the side of the road, underneath a big cottonwood tree, Selman in his pickup truck and a sixpack of cold beer on the hood.

Now that's, I think, an interesting story, but as Paul Harvey says, "Here's the rest of the story." In 1977, twelve years later, I received a phone call in OCE. My secretary said, "There's a man named Selman from Oklahoma on the phone."

I said, "It can't be."

Well, it was. It was the same man. He said, "Colonel''-by now I'm the Chief of Engineers-he said, "Colonel, are you still interested in this project?"

I said, "Yes, I think the Corps is still interested."

He asked if I would come out there and help them. He said, "I'll support this project, but we've got some problems too."

Tony Smith was the district engineer. I called him on the phone and told him I had to go out to Buffalo, Oklahoma, to see Mr. Selman and asked him if he would come along but that he did not have to come. So we met with Selman and his wife. He and Smith then worked together but, as mentioned, the salt study and his project never proceeded. Even so, an enemy became a friend. Maybe the dog had more to do with it than anything else.

I could go on and on about these kinds of tales. One night at a meeting in Guthrie, Oklahoma, on the Optima project, I was supposed to be in the audience and ended up answering questions for about three hours.

During the groundbreaking for the state's Arrowhead Lake Recreation Facility on Lake Eufaula in the late summer of 1963, Carl Albert was suddenly called to Washington. We soon learned that he left during the meeting because of the Cuban missile crisis.

On Good Friday, 13 April 1964, I was honored in Oklahoma City at a luncheon by induction into the Cowboy Hall of Fame. That was Friday, the 13th of April, the date of the Alaskan earthquake. Colonel K.T. Sawyer was district engineer in Alaska and needed help. Captain Jack Sullivan and several civilian employees were sent.

The point of these incidents is simply to illustrate the involvement of the district engineers in various aspects of the public scene.

On 12 October 1962, Dana Knight of the Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma made Colonel Morris, the District Engineer of the Tulsa District, an honorary chieftain of the tribe, with the Ponca name Sungah-Zhaba, Mighty Beaver, because of the district's work on the Arkansas River. "Only a mighty beaver," Knight declared "can conquer the Arkansas River."

Tulsa was a truly special kind of assignment for me and my future. As Goose Bay was to my military construction education, Tulsa was the singular event in developing competence in civil programs. Fortunately, I was able to complete both tours without serious shortcomings or adverse comments which would become part of my performance records.

Q: Let me ask you one question. In the district history, Mr. William Settle mentions establishing area offices as an intermediate layer-

A: Correct.

Q: Could you talk a little bit about that and your management philosophy?

A: Basically, we had so many projects that I just couldn't centralize in Tulsa all decisions above project level. So we set up area offices, both for the construction and the operations phases. For example, the Little River project was some distance from Tulsa, so we had an area office in DeQueen Arkansas, including a real estate suboffice. When we had four or five jobs under construction in the same general area, the most senior of the project managers would be designated area engineer. We wouldn't

necessarily staff it completely. For example, Bill Borland, who was the outstanding project manager of the Eufaula project, was assigned extra staff and an assistant, so he was able to go around his area.

The area engineers were responsible for construction and operations. Field engineering was limited intentionally. Planning and claims issues were kept in the district office. As mentioned, I handled claims myself after the staff did the groundwork, such as estimating and evaluating alternatives. The area engineer was called in as needed, but I often didn't bother him unless I had questions. They had already commented during field negotiations and change processing.

Frequently the resident engineer had developed a firm, often hard, position. Otherwise you probably wouldn't have a claim, would you? I didn't see any point in bringing that atmosphere into the discussions at the higher level unless needed for technical reasons. All it did was dirty the nest a little, cloud the issue. I always believed the contractor should be paid for what he did if it was of value and the government used it. The Corps was not in the business of "breaking" contractors, and, besides, everyone profited if management devoted its talents to project progress rather than tedious and expensive arguments and claim procedures. The philosophy used in Tulsa was expounded from 1972 to 1980 for the entire Corps, a philosophy the Corps needs to follow today and every day.

This leads me to what I fear to be among the most serious problems the Corps faces today: the new procurement officer arrangement. The district engineer should keep the contracting officer responsibility. He knows the work and has the experience to settle these things properly. That's where it should be settled. There's no reason to have a specialist handle construction contracts as is the case with major weapons systems procurements. Besides, the district engineer's position needs to be clear and strong to the customer. It will not be so if he is not the contracting officer.



Colonel Morris in Western riding gear at an equestrian facility while he was district engineer in Tulsa, Oklahoma.

Tulsa didn't have dam failures or serious engineer problems; however, Waco Dam's failure, in the Fort Worth District area, reverberated throughout Tulsa and other districts having a certain type of soil. Also, we had very few accidents. As indicated, real estate was one of the more difficult management challenges.

First off, just the fact of taking land from people is tough even though they may support the project. Those willing to sell got a good price, but land taking is a touchy issue which was compounded in Oklahoma because of the underground oil. You buy surface rights but rarely mineral rights. This matter was even further complicated in Oklahoma because of the Indians. Dealing with the Indian councils and

nations made the real estate problem in Tulsa very complex. The great success of our overall program has to be credited to Dave Helms because of the way he handled real estate matters.

We also helped change some of the contract provisions. Of course, Manning Seltzer, General Counsel, OCE, gets principal credit, but it was Tulsa District that recognized early the impact of changes in *civil* contracts, not only on the work that was changed but, in many cases, items that were not yet completed. Out of that came a significant modification to the changes clause of civil contracts which allowed compensation for the impact of a change on work not yet completed.

Q: The Tulsa District history also says that you had a pretty large role to play at locating the head of navigation for the project.

A: True. Let's see if I can put that all together. The project was designed for the navigation channel to leave the Arkansas River at Muskogee, Oklahoma, move up the Verdigris River through three locks to Catoosa, 12 miles west of Tulsa. Near Catoosa the Verdigris River passes under two I-40 bridges and a railroad bridge, as I recall. The original project had the head of navigation downstream of all three.

Colonel "Babe" Wilson, the head of the ABDA, came to me one day and indicated we had a "head-of-navigation" issue. He said, "It's in the wrong place."

He was right, for we shouldn't end the project immediately behind a major obstacle, especially since operating efficiency would be constrained in that particular location. Also, we still had in mind going to Wichita someday, and there was no point in starting off a new project with a major issue and costs of passing these bridges if we could legally and reasonably include a correction into the ongoing project. Such philosophy, incidentally, would have been beneficial to the Missouri River project, as I was to learn later.

Our studies indicated we could eliminate one of the three locks and its dam on the Verdigris River and save enough money to pay for this extension, which we did. Locating the head of navigation above the bridges was approved. In spite of some troubles which we were able to resolve, the Port of Catoosa now has a more efficient arrangement.

Another interesting vignette about the Tulsa experience involved the completion and dedication of Oolagah Dam in 1962. General Wilson and the governor were present, and it was hot, just terrible. Gerry and our two children attended. The officers wore white uniforms which soon became completely soaked from perspiration. I wondered why in the world we didn't have air-conditioned cars. The reason was simply that the maximum cost allowed for a car in 1962 was $1,200. Well, $1,200 would buy you a car, but it wouldn't buy you an air-conditioned car. I soon noticed that trucks had air conditioning and then discovered that the $1,200 rule didn't apply to trucks-it only applied to automobiles.

So the question was, "What was an automobile and what was a truck?" Come to find out, a four-wheel-drive vehicle was a truck. Well, Jeep had introduced the Wagoneer, a four-wheel-drive station-wagon type of vehicle, so I ordered ten Wagoneers with air conditioning. My procurement people didn't do it right. Instead of buying the vehicles with the air conditioning installed, they bought the vehicles and the air conditioners as separate items. Would you believe that in all the work he had to do, General Dunn noted the procurement of the air conditioners. He phoned me one day and asked why in the world was I buying ten air conditioners for vehicles.

I said, "Well, I'm going to put them in those trucks."

So he said, "What are you talking about?"

I went through the whole thing. He said, "Okay." That's how the Corps of Engineers obtained its first air-conditioned office vehicles.

Tulsa was possibly the Morris family's favorite career place and job. We still have many friends. I had an opportunity after I retired to spend a lot of time in Tulsa. When our son John was married, the minister of our church in Tulsa came to St. Louis to perform the service. If John had a problem when he was stationed in the Middle West, he'd go to Tulsa and see Father Richard Daniels. Susan communicated for years with some of her Tulsa friends. It was a highlight of our life, personally as well as professionally.

Q: I interviewed several generals who said that the district engineer's job is the best job to have.

A: I think so too. When you leave it, you are sure to have the "ex-district engineer syndrome."

Q: Looking back on your military career as you left Tulsa, how would you characterize it?

A: Leaving Tulsa in the summer of 1965 was the tenth anniversary of my going to Goose Bay, Labrador. That decade probably was the most critical in my development because of the assignments and the people with whom I was associated. At Goose Bay, you recall, I was the resident engineer on a tough military construction job under a very strong-minded boss with whom I couldn't communicate easily. The weather didn't help either. That was the first time I had been in a responsible position dealing with a very complex construction problem, a cost-plus type contract and a client, the air base commanding general, who was very demanding of engineers-a broadening experience and an education in understanding the construction processes and in future planning of the work to maximize the brief outdoor construction period. Certainly the Goose Bay job increased my understanding of and self-confidence in executing complex contracts,

The OCE personnel assignment was a complete change of pace-to staff duty from command. I became associated with the then current and the future leadership of the Corps. Assignment of Corps officers develops compassion and a willingness to understand the problems of individual officers and their families while being responsible for their education and development.

Korea, as a commander of the Army's top divisional combat battalion in an outpost situation, followed by schooling at the Army War College, refreshed my understanding of the military organization and role of the combat engineer and broadened my knowledge of national strategy. These two years provided my initial association with personnel from other nations, other services, and the Department of State. Next came the Tulsa District and total immersion in the civil works program with all the political, planning, and engineering implications that go with it, particularly contract management.

So those four or five assignments covering a ten-year period gave me the background to assume any job within the Corps and many positions within the Department of Defense or even in the political arena. So that was an important period when looked at collectively because it exposed me to most of the responsibilities an engineer officer is supposed to understand-troops, personnel management, military construction, public works, and Department of the Army level staff.

West Point

A: Upon my departure from Tulsa the "ex-district engineer syndrome" set in immediately as we reported to the Military Academy at West Point for duty in the Department of Tactics. Until this time we had never lived on an Army post except while in school. Gerry had reached the point of believing we never would.

Q: How did you get your assignment at the Military Academy?

A: Bob Tarbox, Colonel Tarbox, an engineer colonel that I knew well from my days as a cadet and again in Guam in WW II, was a regimental commander at West Point. While still at Tulsa, I wrote him a letter and asked him if there were any possibility I could be selected to replace him in the summer of 1965. The dean was General Johnny Jannarone, whom I knew and who had been in Tulsa. The superintendent was General James Lampert, an engineer general. Tarbox, said he didn't think it was possible because they were not going to have successive engineers as regimental commanders at West Point. General Mike Davison was the commandant and indicated he'd prefer someone else.

General Lampert apparently concluded that I should come to West Point even if I didn't go to the Tactical Department. As luck would have it, the Military Academy was to be expanded from 2,800 to 4,400 cadets to make it comparable to the Naval Academy in size. That meant the corps of cadets would expand to four regiments of cadets, and thus two new regimental commanders were needed. I was then selected to be the first commander of the new Third Regiment. On arrival, we were given temporary quarters on the post while our more permanent quarters were being rehabilitated. We then moved into the same lovely quarters occupied by the Tarboxes. In the meantime, I had commenced my duties at West Point as a "Tac"

Instead of worrying about planning, constructing and operating projects-hundreds of millions of dollars, and all the frustrations of that type of job, I had a very minor budget at West Point, and a very small number of people to work with and oversee. There was a brief feeling of letdown, but I soon realized the importance of dealing with young men in whose hands the future of the Army would soon be placed. Once that was put in perspective, we went about the business of helping America's finest young men develop into military leaders.

After the first year, having gotten the Third Regiment off to a good start-1 hope it was good-1 was moved up to be deputy commandant. Colonel Gray Wheelock, the deputy commander, had been selected for promotion to brigadier general and transferred. So I moved up to his position. The commandant by then was Brigadier General Richard "Dick" Scott, an armor officer. His military assistant, Captain [Thomas P.] Carney, became a lieutenant general and Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. My supporting staff included Major Max Thurman, who later became the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the commanding general of Forces Command, the commanding general of U.S. activities during the Panama Christmas event, and also the person primarily responsible for upgrading the

Colonel John W. Morris as a "Tac" at West Point in August 1965.

Army to its excellent status at the end of the 1980s.

In addition to Thurman, my replacement as commander of the Third Regiment was Colonel Alexander Haig. The three colonels heading up the other regiments were also top notch. Of course, the cadets ran the regiments. The officers were there to provide counsel, guidance, military training and discipline, so to speak.

As deputy commandant, my responsibilities were basically overseeing the internal operation of the corps of cadets, scheduling military training, et cetera. I was the point of contact for the chairman of the Cadet Honor Committee. So it was an interesting job, and being close to the cadets we became involved in many pleasant extracurricular activities. Cadets frequently came to our home, and even more frequently their girlfriends stayed with us on weekends. Susan was in her late teens and a student at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. She was home often and increased the cadet traffic at our place.

In 1966, I was responsible for the corps of cadets during the Army-Navy game in Philadelphia. Game day began with rain, which started to clear about 11:00 A.M. The Naval Academy officer in charge and I agreed that all would wear raincoats during the march-in. The Middies appeared with no raincoats. Their raincoats were very small, and when rolled could be put in their pocket. Cadet raincoats were very heavy and you couldn't do that. The Chief of Staff of the Army, with whom I happened to be standing when the Navy started to march in, was obviously concerned, as was I. If the cadets marched in wearing raincoats, it wouldn't look too good for the Army.

The Secretary of the Army was there also. I hustled back to the cadets who were formed outside the stadium and told my deputy, who was Lieutenant Colonel Bob Yerks [he also became a three-star general], that I wanted every cadet to take off his raincoat and pass it to the man behind him and then have the last rank fall out and walk around the stadium and come in the back ramps while the rest of the corps, less one rank, marched into the stadium. The only problem was I'd forgotten that the last rank were all first classmen, upperclassmen, and they certainly weren't going to carry raincoats with all those plebes around, so there was a lot of shuffling in the rear of the companies. It soon settled down.

We marched in without raincoats to the relief of the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Army. It was an exciting and risky event. If we'd have planned it, I'm not sure it would have worked; however, it was done spontaneously and came out okay.

Interestingly enough, the biggest problem was getting the raincoats back to their owners. For about half the game, raincoats were flying through the air. I may have forgotten who won the game, but I shall always remember the raincoat problem and the improbable solution.

Being involved with the cadets in activities such as chapel, athletics, academics, and their personal, even social life made ours a full-time, seven-days-a-week task, especially for Gerry, but she thrived on the life at the Academy. Having Susan enrolled in the University of Connecticut and John in Valley Forge Military Academy, after one year at Highland Falls, helped her schedule somewhat.

In the fall of 1966, I was selected to go to the University of Pittsburgh for a course in advanced management which carried with it a two-year service obligation. After finishing the course, I returned to my duties as deputy commandant. In the spring of 1967, General Scott was replaced by Brigadier General Bernie Rogers, classmate and close friend. I was delighted to be working with and for him. In early October 1967, I was very surprised to get the word I was being transferred to Washington. Our three years would have been up in the summer of 1968.

Because of the early sudden move, I went to see General [Donald] Bennett, the superintendent. I indicated I thought it was not the right time to move since my term wasn't up, et cetera. He said

the Chief of Staff of the Army had already approved the move for me to be the deputy chief, Legislative Liaison. My boss was to be Howard Penney, Major General Penney.

That part was fine because Penney had been my predecessor in Tulsa and was an engineer officer, but I still had an uneasy feeling about the move, a feeling without substance as time would prove. General Bennett, superintendent, later claimed credit for my becoming Chief of Engineers, based on letting me go to Legislative Liaison.

Gerry and I bought a house in Arlington. We left John and Susan in the north and arrived in Washington from West Point on 27 November in the middle of a blizzard. We managed to get the furniture into the house the second day. Soon thereafter, I reported to work as the deputy chief, Legislative Liaison, for the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army.

Q: I wonder if I could interrupt you just briefly on a couple of things about West Point. You were there just as the Vietnam build-up was beginning, the build-up of troops?

A: Yes.

Q: What kind of impact did that have on the cadets?

A: It had quite a bit. Colonel [Alexander] Haig, for example, had been to Vietnam as had many other of the tactical officers. Vietnam was a subject of discussion on the military training side and many of the lecturers that came to West Point talked about Vietnam.

That war would affect me personally as our cadets went off to Vietnam as young officers. Tommy Hayes [West Point, 1966], an outstanding cadet, was the son of Major General Tom Hayes, Corps of Engineers. Thomas Hayes IV, I believe, was deputy cadet brigade commander. Everybody liked him and he was a very strong young man.

He came to see me before branch drawing and asked if I thought his father's being a major general in the Corps should have an effect on his choosing engineers. I told him, "No." He chose the Corps of Engineers, went off to Vietnam and was killed. Very sad.

Cadet [William] Booth, a company commander of F Company, 3d Regiment, graduated in the class of 1966. While in Vietnam, I suggested that [Major] General [John A.B.] Dillard select him as his aide. He did. They were both killed in a helicopter. There are too many memories of similar events involving Vietnam and the cadets during our time at West Point.

There were many, many small things at West Point that were interesting-you could write almost a book. One year a group of cadets stole the Navy goat. Cadet [Thomas] Carhart was the motivator. There'd been an agreement between the superintendents they wouldn't do that sort of thing that year. As deputy commandant, I had to head up the investigation and recommend appropriate disciplinary steps.

There was no question about the fact that they stole the goat. So punishment had to be meted out even though everyone was pleased with the achievement. The punishment, while minor, wasn't too popular with the corps.

As deputy commandant, I also was chairman of the Uniform Committee of nine members, including the chairman. The cadet bathrobe in 1965–66 was a long, heavy bathrobe, for which the Army could no longer get the material. So a short, knee-length bathrobe was selected. A question arose over the color of the single stripe to put on the sleeve. Well, we voted and got three votes for black, three for gold, and three for gray-the USMA colors.

As the committee pondered this problem, a cadet from the parade arrived to put the parade flags in the storage case in the conference room. As he began to leave I said, "Young man, if you were going to put a stripe on your new bathrobe, would you put black, gray, or gold?"

He said, "I'd put gold on."

That's how we got the gold stripe on the bathrobes.

We had a lot of interesting events. I don't think they relate to the interview, but the last June week I was there, one of our officers had some of the cadets' girlfriends stay at his quarters. The night before graduation, the ladies had gone to a party of some kind, and one was very upset with her cadet escort. She came home and she made some comment about her "husband." It's against the rules for cadets to get married. So when reported to me, I called the young cadet in, and he admitted he was married.

I explained to him, his parents, and his girlfriend that when he signed in the previous night he also signed that he was not married. He had lied. The matter was turned over to the Honor Committee, which met quickly. He was found guilty of an honor violation and given a chance to resign as a cadet, which he did. Since he had successfully finished his academics, he still got his diploma, but not a commission.

West Point provides a special human as well as academic experience. My aim was to deal with every cadet as an individual, so we had a policy in my regiment to build on strength-find out what a young man was good at and build on that. There's so much negative up there anyhow, you know, demerits and the plebe system and all. The policy worked.

As a senior colonel I was not going to give any demerits myself. I felt that if I brought a young man in and talked to him, that would be enough unless it was something very serious. That turned out to be a pretty good idea, too, because it gave me a chance to talk to a lot of cadets I otherwise would have just written up on a piece of paper.

My earlier assignment in the career development field was beneficial to this assignment, and also I learned a lot about how an officer is made. As a cadet going through West Point, you see things mostly as they affect you personally, but when you're in an oversight position, you see the whole picture-a broader perspective. It certainly did increase my love and devotion to the Military Academy and bring a better understanding of what it does and does very well.

Historically, 25 to 35 percent of an entering class did not graduate. In the early 1960s, a lot of effort was going into keeping the ones who were leaving. I made a little study and I found out that the losses generally distributed themselves in the lower half, one way or another. I took the position that we shouldn't change the system to keep the lower group when we were going to lose up to 30 percent historically anyhow. A better idea was to get the entrance criteria more precise so that when the young man came in, he was more apt to stay. Certainly in the United States there were 1,100 young men who would stay at West Point if we could find them.

Q: You were in a position to see what cadets chose the Corps of Engineers.

A: Yes. Well, branch drawing was always important. As deputy commandant, I didn't want to be overly pushy about the engineers. Besides, I had learned that whoever came in the Corps would be qualified. It wasn't a matter of getting a winner or a loser, they were all winners, so it's just a question of helping those who were not sure to make up their minds. There were cadet counselors established for each branch.

Q: I wanted to get you to talk a little bit more about the advanced management course. I'm not too familiar with it.

A: Oh, well, there were two or three in the United States at the time. The most prestigious was Harvard. Harvard had a 13-week advanced management course. The one at Pittsburgh was a little shorter. I think it was 10 or 11 weeks. Our course included about 35 students, mostly Americans. These were people who had had a certain amount of senior managerial experience and were on the threshold of corporate executive positions. One purpose of the course was to make them qualified.

It turned out that as a district engineer, I had had more leadership and managerial experience than most individuals in the course. Nevertheless, it was a help to me because I got an insight into the business world and met some outstanding people.

The one thing I came out of that course with was the fact that you need to know yourself. If you don't and you're not honest with yourself, you can't communicate very well. I'll make that clearer. In one exercise, they gave every student a list of 10 or 15 adjectives. Each person rated everyone else in the class against each of these adjectives. Also himself. You kept your own and gave the others to the professor. The professor then passed all the ratings on each person to that individual. The question was, "How did you rate yourself in relation to how others rated you?"

That was an interesting exercise. The man who had been elected class president came out number one on that test. There was no correlation between the two events. The four officers selected for the class officers were in the top four on that test. I've been impressed with that all my life. If a person understands himself, he will be more apt to have people understand or to receive the message he thinks he is sending.

At the least it helps you to be a better communicator. That's the important part. If you communicate with somebody and they don't understand, it's probably your fault. The sender is more at fault than the receiver. People often say, "I told you to do something, why didn't you do it?" Well, you might want to think that over a little bit. Maybe they didn't understand what you told them to do.

Q: So it was pretty select, only a very small number of officers.

A: Yes. When I was in career development I think we sent maybe four or five a year, something like that, out of the Corps. There were a couple of other Army officers at Pittsburgh but no other engineers. Most of the students were nonmilitary.

Legislative Liaison

Q: In November 1967 you came back to Washington as deputy chief, Legislative Liaison.

A: Yes.

Q: How did you feel about that assignment?

A: I liked the assignment. I felt I was fairly well qualified for it because of duty in Savannah and especially Tulsa. Maybe that's how I got the job. That plus Howard Penney. The job was a dual-hatted job. We worked directly for the Secretary of the Army, and also for the Chief of Staff of the Army on legislative matters. I think the chief, Legislative Liaison, is among the more important jobs around the Pentagon. The Legislative Liaison people were seldom out front, but they're always there, giving advice and analyzing congressional attitudes. As I mentioned earlier, I think Howard Penney was the best staff officer I've ever known, and a great teacher.

The key issue during that assignment was Vietnam. As you know, President Johnson was into it deeply. General William Westmoreland was asking for more troops, if you remember. We in

Legislative Liaison had to get the requirement into the right format for presentations to the Congress by the president We worked night and day on a plan to send some 200,000 soldiers to General Westmoreland as he requested; 19,000 were to be in the advance party. On the 31st of March 1968, President Johnson came on TV, and he announced he was sending in the 19,000. He also said that night he was not going to run for reelection and never mentioned the remaining troops. We sent the 19,000, but we never did send the remainder.

There were frequent political bombshells popping up when you didn't expect them. The Secretary of the Army had a real situation on his hands with the M–16 problem. Bob Jordan, General Counsel for the Army, personally took this project aboard. General Penney and he worked literally weeks and months on that one problem, to try to get it settled down to whether the Army would keep the M–16 rifle. Of course, our rifle manufacturers were all over it because they wanted to make the weapons.

Then little things often got important. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee in the House of Representatives was Mendel Rivers, a dynamic and powerful man from South Carolina. He had a retired marine general as counsel for the committee. Rivers could and did bring pressure on the Secretary of the Army through his committee. He'd call the secretary for a hearing, and if it was a tough subject he'd have the whole committee present.

Roger Courier of our office was a close personal friend of Mr. Rivers and would keep us posted on matters of importance to the chairman and his staffers.

I got a call one day from a certain staffer who said, "You'd better do something about that bag boy situation over at Fort Myer." He said, "The chairman is very interested." The bag boys had become impolite and destructive in filling patrons' bags, but they were part of President Johnson's Youth Improvement Program. These were predominantly minorities, so we had to be careful that we just didn't summarily get them out. Besides that, we didn't know who was going to do the work if they left. Roger Currier checked into it and reported that the chairman was not interested.

Pretty soon I got another phone call from the staffer saying, "What have you done about the bag boys?" I told him we were working on it and I'd get back to him. Well, this time it happened that Currier was going to go to South Carolina with Mr. Rivers. In the meantime, I thought I'd better do something about this. I'd better have a plan. So we got the Army staffers together with representatives of the CG at Fort Myer, and we came up with a plan of what we'd do if necessary.

Roger Currier came back from this trip, said, "Don't worry. I mentioned it to the chairman and he didn't say anything."

About a week later, a letter came floating in signed by Mr. Rivers to the effect that for over four weeks or so nothing had happened, so Secretary [Stanley] Resor was to appear before the full committee on a certain day. Secretary of the Army Resor knew nothing about all this, so I had to explain the whole thing to him. Fortunately, we had a draft letter telling the chairman that by Monday morning the problem would be eliminated. Soldiers would do the bagging for a short period of time while this situation was better resolved.

He sent the letter, but he still had to appear for the hearing. By the time the secretary had arrived, Mr. Rivers had received the letter. The hearing was warm and friendly with accolades for the Secretary of the Army for having been so positive and efficient in solving this problem.

General Penney had let me handle this while he was taking care of other issues. Mr. Resor is a wonderful man. We still get cards from him every year, and I see him occasionally.

Another interesting event occurred before the one I just related. I hadn't been in Washington more than a few days and was told that I would escort to West Point a special investigating committee which was headed up by Congressman [Edward] Hébert. Hébert was number two in the House Armed Services Committee.

The investigation was to consider why Army had turned down a request to play a post-season football game in the Sugar Bowl in New Orleans against Louisiana State University. Mr. Hébert had been instrumental in getting Army invited. When the Chief of Staff of the Army and the secretary decided to decline, the cadets and Mr. Hébert were really upset. I was still at West Point when the turndown occurred, but the investigation started after I got to Washington. I remember the cadets took all the sugar bowls off the table from the dining room in protest for not being able to go to the game in the Sugar Bowl.

Well, anyway, I'd only been gone about a week and I was back up at West Point with this investigation. The congressman made his point, but the Army didn't play in the bowl game, either.

The Legislative Liaison job has impact on many activities. On one occasion, the Senate Armed Services Committee was meeting on the authorization bill, and I happened to be outside when the staffer came out and asked if I could help resolve a problem at West Point.

The East Academic Building, a new building to be built at West Point, was about to be axed to save money. The discussion favored cutting back on entrants for a couple of years to delay the need. I drew a little sketch to show that the students who would use that building were already at West Point, and by the time the building was finished they'd be ready to use it.

So he grabbed the sloppy sketch and took it back in the Senate. In about 15 minutes he reported the building was in the bill. That's just how close it was. I've seen this gentleman two or three times since then, and he always remarks on how that East Academic Building at West Point was saved. Legislative Liaison was an important job. You soon learn that at that level facts and accuracy are crucial-guesses are dangerous.

Q: You were heavily involved in the funeral arrangements for Robert Kennedy, weren't you?

A: Yes. Whenever a senior Executive Branch official is to be buried, one of the services will be designated to manage the congressional delegation that goes to the funeral. When Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated, that project was assigned to the Army even though the Kennedys were Navy people.

Because Mr. Kennedy was running for president, he had a large political campaign staff. Of course they became involved with everything, and the situation became confused. Besides that, the funeral services were to be in Saint Patrick's Cathedral in New York, and the interment in Arlington Cemetery, Virginia.

General Penney decided he would stay in Washington and take care of the situation here, particularly the event at the Arlington Cemetery, and receive the cortege when it came from New York on the train. I was to go to New York where my first stop was at the "Kennedy for President" headquarters. That was a real madhouse, and I was getting nowhere. I wasn't able to find anybody to talk to. It may have been orderly to somebody, but it wasn't to me.

Finally, I saw a familiar face which I recalled from the dedication of the Eufaula Dam in Oklahoma. He, a Mr. Bruno, also recalled the event, so I explained that I had about 200 members of the Congress of the United States and their wives coming to the funeral, and my responsibility was to get them into Saint Patrick's Cathedral and seated as a group.

He suggested I go to the cathedral and rope off a section. Some advice! My big problem became getting a piece of rope. At Saint Patrick's Cathedral I met a member of the church staff, and I told him what I needed. So I roped off a section of enough seats and went on my way.

Well, this had taken pretty much the day. Next, I arranged for five buses to bring the delegation from the airport and soon realized I had another big problem-where to park them near the cathedral. Around 10 o'clock at night I called Mayor John Lindsay's office. He was there, it turned out, and I was passed to the chief of police. I was told to get a piece of rope and block off five spaces on 51st Street, which is alongside Saint Patrick's. So I did the rope trick again.

We finally got the congressmen and their wives into the church and everything went fine. The members of Congress thought it was well planned! All reserved areas remained intact, and the members of Congress and their spouses were seated without incident.

Finally, the service was over—a very emotional service, if you recall. Originally, I had planned to come back on the train, but I decided I would fly back down to Washington to help General Penney get ready for the interment.

When we were ready to board the airplane, Senator [Howard] Cannon, Nevada, a major general in the Air Force Reserve, was absent. Senator [Everett] Dirksen, Senator McClellan, and their wives were hot and perspiring. So we decided to depart and have Senator Cannon follow in the standby aircraft.

Once we landed at Andrews and the congressional people were on their way to town, I waited until the second plane arrived with Senator Cannon aboard to explain that I regretted leaving him but we couldn't wait any longer in New York. He was satisfied with the decision and indicated he would have been embarrassed if the group had had to wait for him.

I'm sure you recall that the train bringing the body struck a boy in New Jersey and was delayed about six hours. Instead of getting to D.C. around 4:30 P.M. or 5:00 P.M., it was about 11:00 P.M.

In the meantime, we had to change our plans from a daytime to a nighttime interment. Consequently, we needed hundreds of candles. Well, where do you find so many candles after 6:00 P.M.? Finally, I called the cathedral, and with their help and others we were able to round up enough candles. The hot, rainy, damp night plus the emotional situation caused several people to faint. General Penney and I each carried ammonia capsules for those who needed them.

In the summer of 1968, Mr. [Ralph] Abernathy and his Freedom Marchers and also Mr. [César] Chavez and the lettuce and vegetable people from California were in town. Requests came from Chavez and from Abernathy to bring their people to the grave site. They were accommodated,.

As it happened, the Penneys weeks earlier had scheduled a party that night. We finally got to his house at 1 o'clock in the morning. Everybody was gone except Gerry and his wife.

Well, that was the Legislative Liaison, except for one other event. I had been a colonel by then seven years and, having missed a couple of opportunities to be a general, I figured I wasn't going to make it.

I had not been looking for a job, but sometime in February 1968, Bob Kerr, Senator Kerr's oldest son, came to see me and asked me if I would like to be the director of the Kerr Foundation out in Oklahoma. Don McBride, my old friend, had come along, and I told them I was very interested. I also explained, because I'd gone to the University of Pittsburgh, I had a commitment to remain in service for two years or until October 1968. Bob said fine.

In March 1968, Howard Penney came to me one day and announced that I had been selected for brigadier general. When the brigadier general nomination evolved, I had to decide whether to take

this job in Oklahoma or stay in the Army. I knew I was going to go to Vietnam if I stayed in the Army. Gerry and I discussed the matter, and I told Mr. Kerr I couldn't accept his offer. I stayed in the Pentagon another year after the list came out, till the spring of 1969. Meantime, Penney left and my orders to Vietnam were issued. I told Secretary Resor goodbye. General [Harold K.] Johnson had been replaced by General Westmoreland [as Chief of Staff of the Army]. I was assigned to the 18th Engineer Brigade in Vietnam.

I left to go there in late April and arrived in Saigon on 29 April. Before that, my wife and I had gone to Bermuda for a week holiday. I had told her I'd see her in Hawaii during Christmas 1969, left from Baltimore, and flew on out there. You want to ask any questions about the Legislative Liaison?

Q: Yes, a couple of quick ones. Was this assignment important in terms of your getting more knowledge about Congress, the congressional staff?

A: Yes. It was very important in that regard. I probably should have emphasized that.

In this assignment we dealt with Congress on specific issues, and normally they were adversarial. Either you informed the Congress in advance or the staff became upset because they didn't get the word early. I spent much time with all committees of Congress that had an interest in the Army.

The Legislative Liaison job was very, very challenging. The responsibilities were rather heavy, and I think Howard Penney gave me more freedom than most deputies. During the lull between Penney's leaving and his replacement's coming in, General Westmoreland became Chief of Staff. The following might be a good example of the staff aspects of the office of the chief, Legislative Liaison, during the weekly staff meetings. The Legislative Liaison people sat along the wall and the principal staff members sat at the table. During General Westmoreland's first or second meeting as the Chief of Staff, he indicated he would like to invite all the newly elected congressmen over for an orientation. He asked for the Legislative Liaison person. That was me, so I announced myself. He asked me my thoughts on his plan. I explained that my initial reaction was that it was not too good of an idea because the new congressmen are not as important as the old congressmen. If we were going to brief anybody, we should brief the senior people before the junior, newly elected members.

It turned out that General [Fred] Weyand, who had been director of Legislative Liaison before Penney, was present. General Westmoreland turned to him and said, "Well, Fred, what do you think about this? You used to run Legislative Liaison."

Weyand commented that if we were going to brief somebody, then brief the committee chairmen. Don't start off with the least important people.

Well, that was my introduction to General Westmoreland. He appreciated the comment. The point however is that Legislative Liaison is involved in most routine business of the Army staff. On a daily basis the job took more of my time than any job I ever had. I had little control over my destiny because the issues arose without warning, were so varied, and involved the Army's top leaders. In hindsight, I capsulize the office of the chief of Legislative Liaison as requiring thorough, accurate analysis of tough issues and the value of taking a clear, firm stand on your views. Your seniors need them.

Q: While you were there, the protest movement against the war began to grow, didn't it?

A: Yes, very much so. In fact, they burned Washington while I was there, but I missed Under Secretary [David] McGiffert's going to the steps of the Pentagon and making his speech.

Vietnam ran through all of the things we were doing. Events like the Robert Kennedy funeral, the bag boys, so forth and so on, those were blips because the mainstream of our business dealt with Vietnam. The Tet Offensive had a major impact on legislative activities.

Q: Did congressmen come to you when there were the riots in Washington after Martin Luther King was assassinated?

A: Not to my recollection. When Martin Luther King was assassinated, I was in Chief of Staff General Johnson's office the moment it came on the TV. It was late in the evening. He was very upset about that and anticipated troubles.

The city was burning, then. My daughter, I remember, came to Washington by plane. I met her, and when she landed she mentioned how terrible it was to see from the air that the capital city of Washington was being torched.

I didn't personally get involved in any of the demonstrations nor with congressional activities.

Q: Are there more things you'd like to talk about with the Legislative Liaison?

A: It was a jewel and a very interesting assignment. It's one of those jobs, again, where you have recurring opportunities to fail. I keep talking about that, but there are a lot of jobs where you don't have a chance to screw up, you're too protected. Not so in Goose Bay, nor in Tulsa, and certainly not in Legislative Liaison. Legislative Liaison was the least protected and the most exposed.

I do want to add a comment about the excellent staff. The ladies that worked in that office really trained the new officers. They were tremendous. Ethel Lamers was just a spectacular person as far as work and understanding were concerned, and she was better than most people will ever be in handling tough politicians.

So it was a good assignment and there was nothing pretentious about it. We had some of the worst offices in the Pentagon. We couldn't go anywhere without going up and down stairs. That was probably about the way it should be because you could never find us. If a visitor wanted to find the chief of Legislative Liaison, he'd need a map or a guide or something. General Penney spent a lot of time with the Chiefs of Staff and with the Secretary of the Army, and so did I.

Finally, upon leaving the Army staff for Vietnam, I had the clear belief that my career development was complete and that whatever success I might have henceforth would depend entirely on how well I had learned the lessons from the assignments I had been given leading to selection for general officer rank. Frankly, I was satisfied at the time that those assignments covered whatever might lie ahead in either engineer or branch-immaterial duty. Still, I was to learn that even 26 years had not fully prepared me for Vietnam, nor for the environmental experiences yet to come.

Before turning to Vietnam, I need to mention that my father had died in January 1969. My mother was a semi-invalid and alone. Also my mother-in-law was ill. Susan was about to graduate from the University of Connecticut. In the summer of 1968 I had sworn in John as a private in the U.S. Army and he had entered the West Point Prep School shortly thereafter. When I left for Vietnam, he was waiting to be accepted for the Academy. If he missed, I would have seen him in Vietnam. Consequently, I had to leave Gerry by herself and also to attempt to settle my father's estate by mail from Southeast Asia. It was not a good time for me to be away, but I doubt there ever is.

Vietnam

Q: You were assigned next to the 18th Engineer Brigade in South Vietnam.

A: Yes. Returning to the military situation. My service in Korea by now was ten years old when I arrived in Vietnam. The U.S. Army, Vietnam, engineer was General Dave Parker whom I've mentioned earlier: Tokyo after World War II, Korea in 1960, and now again in Vietnam. His deputy was Brigadier General Bob Tarbox, whom I'd known in Guam and again at West Point, plus other places along the way.

The 18th Engineer Brigade served the northern half of Vietnam. Our brigade headquarters, the aviation section, and a relatively small number of soldiers, most of them involved with the headquarters operations, were located at Dong Ba Thin near Cam Ranh. The brigade consisted of **16** engineer battalions-combat and construction battalions-and numerous separate companies. They were spread throughout the northern half of South Vietnam, all the way from the DMZ down to the 20th Brigade on a line generally westward from Phan Rang.

Our main missions were to support the combat troops and perform the heavy regional construction. The construction battalions were committed primarily to lines of communication [LOC]. The combat battalions supported by a light equipment company also worked on the LOC unless support of a divisional mission took priority.

In the scheme of things, we had one combat battalion out of the 18th Engineer Brigade in support of each numbered division. The 1 st Cavalry Division, the 101 st Airborne Division up at Hue, Phu Bai, the 4th Division near Pleiku, the America1 Division at Chu Lai, and a brigade of the 5th Division were located in the 18th Brigade area of operation. In addition, we supported numerous miscellaneous signal and special forces.

Our battalions were self-contained and, generally speaking, were in remote areas. Consequently, we had frequent incidents with the Vietcong and, in some cases, North Vietnamese soldiers. We suffered more casualties than you normally would have expected for engineer units. Our men were very busy, and as a result, we had fewer disciplinary, morale, or drug problems.

As brigade commander, I set goals and then spent much of my time in the helicopter visiting our work sites and also our troop units to keep up to speed on their activities and finding out what we could do to help them.

There were several significant construction projects. One was to build a road out to the A Shau Valley. A reinforced engineer battalion commanded by Colonel Melvin Johnson was in charge of this very difficult task. He did a fine job. When it was finished, General [Richard] Stillwell, who was the commanding general of the XXIV Corps, came out and made a special presentation to our engineers for that excellent work.

The 326th Engineer Battalion [101 st Airborne Division] commander was Lieutenant Colonel Henry J. Hatch. General Stillwell's chief of staff was my West Point classmate Bud Bolling. I became fairly close to General Stillwell, a great commander with wonderful leadership qualities. His farewell address to his troops when he was replaced by General Mel Zais was truly inspirational.

The LOC program was the highlight of the construction. I don't recall how many miles we built. General [Frederick] Clarke, Chief of Engineers, had dedicated his brilliance and thoughts to a plan to replace the normal military maintenance system for heavy equipment. As a result, the LOC equipment was the typical yellow U.S. items purchased "off the shelf' and maintained under special contract with a firm headquartered or at least managed out of St. Louis. We had a 24-hour

turnaround on parts. Consequently, what would have been otherwise an impossible equipment maintenance job was effectively executed.

Many of our soldiers, who had no experience building roads, soon learned how to operate asphalt plants, rock quarries, et cetera. We set up, in our brigade area, a number of industrial sites consisting of a quarry, rock-crushing capability, an asphalt plant, and materials needed to build bridges, culverts, et cetera, associated with roads. Usually, these sites were at a construction battalion headquarters. Colonel George Rebh, deputy brigade commander, helped a great deal in developing the concept of these well-planned and efficient industrial sites throughout the brigade area.

The real problem, of course, was keeping the asphalt plants in operation. We improved as we went along, and we surely tried. Still, I don't think we ever were fully efficient, although we did pave a lot of roads. The reasons for paving the roads were multiple. First, better roads allowed our troops to move more efficiently, and the pavement almost eliminated the use of land mines. Until the roads were paved, we had to sweep every road each morning with mine detectors to be sure the Vietcong had placed no mines overnight.

The combat operations consisted mainly of countering night attacks and supporting the combat divisions. We did have noteworthy tactical incidents, however.

The 299th Engineer Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Newman Howard, was located between Dak To and Ben Het, west of Pleiku. Ben Het was so close to the border that the enemy was always nearby, destroying or at least interfering with transportation. In early 1970, the South Vietnamese were providing security for a 299th Engineer Battalion convoy en route to Ben Het when attacked by North Vietnamese. We had a couple of people killed and some equipment damaged. Colonel Howard personally got his troops out okay but was very upset with the South Vietnamese security. I remember asking the corps commander to replace the engineer battalion with an infantry battalion. He decided that if we did that, the South Vietnamese would think we didn't have confidence in their ability to protect us.

In a few weeks, the same event recurred and a very tough fight ensued. Again Howard extricated the troops and received the Silver Star for gallantry. His battalion was so badly beaten up by those two events that it had to be moved to the rear [east coast area]. Then it was replaced by an infantry unit.

I do remember the wonderful officers and enlisted personnel. The roster of battalion commanders and group commanders in my brigade sounds like the leadership of the Corps for the next decade. Jack Waggoner, commander of the 45th Group, became a major general. He was replaced by Colonel Carroll LeTellier, later a major general; Harry Griffith was the 35th Group commander, lieutenant general. The 937th, Bob Marshall, later a major general. Hap Adams, Colonel [Carroll E.] Adams [Jr.] who was killed, was a brigadier general promotable.

Then the battalion commanders sounded also like a *Who's Who* list: Hugh Robinson, Sam Kem, John Wall, Ernie Edgar, Jim Donovan, and an S-3 named Art Williams-all future generals.

Command Sergeant Major Santecrose was truly a great NCO. He traveled everywhere I did, and his famous expression to the troops was, "Get with the program." He was a dynamic influence. We each spent over 700 hours that year in a helicopter, going from place to place.

Our chaplain, Lieutenant Colonel Stewart Wetherall, was an inspiration to our troops and was always with our front-line battalions. I remember going with him at Christmastime to every unit and to every person that we could find. As in Korea, the value of religious leadership to soldiers was undeniable.

The holidays were probably the most painful part for the troops, being so far from home under such adverse circumstances. Because General Clarke came to Vietnam near the Christmas holidays, my trip to Hawaii to be with Gerry never happened. I didn't get to see my wife during the tour, but we did communicate by daily letters and frequent tapes.

General Parker was a prime player in my Vietnam experience. He, Carroll Le Tellier, and I were doing a reconnaissance when we ran into a typhoon just off of Da Nang. We had to land our helicopter in the "bowling alley," a flat area where there was continuous enemy activity. We ended up convincing the pilot that we were sitting ducks in the middle of a shooting range. He finally got the helicopter off the ground and up to an artillery outpost called "Los Banyos." The wind was blowing so hard that the pilot said he wouldn't shut down the chopper for fear the wind would ruin the rotor. When the chopper ran out of gas that is exactly what happened.

Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor (left) with Engineer officers Colonel Harry Griffith, Major General David S. Parker, and Brigadier General John W. Morris in South Vietnam in 1970.

We were finally rescued in a half-track by Captain Ronald Bartek [West Point, 1966] to end a wet and miserable day. General Parker, all his life, felt that we almost did him in on that day.

My most vivid memory relates to an event after I left. Prior to departure, I had laid on an orientation program for my successor-General [Henry] Shrader. When he arrived, I soon departed, and after a couple of false starts in Saigon got back to the United States as scheduled

in early May 1970. I'd been in the States about ten days and happened to be in OCE when I was called to see General Clarke. He told me that there'd been a helicopter accident in Vietnam, and he knew that one engineer general officer had been killed. He told me where it was and that he knew it was a major general. It had to be General Jack Dillard, and based on location, I figured the 937th Group and probably the 20th Engineer Battalion commanders were aboard too. I also listed all the people I thought would be on the chopper. Unfortunately, I was correct.

As I recall, 11 people were killed. One survived, Sergeant Major [Robert W.] Elkey, who was the 937th command sergeant major at that time. Elkey was thrown out the chopper, badly wounded and fortunate to survive. Everyone else was killed. A most distressing experience for me because not only did I know everybody but I'd been involved with many being there. Captain Booth [West Point, 1966] had become General Dillard's aide based on my recommendation. I had sent my pilot to the 937th to improve the efficiency of that aviation section, and the co-pilot, CWO Adams, was similarly placed. So while that didn't happen when I was in Vietnam, it was certainly part of my Vietnam experience.

I went to all the funerals that I could. When I first took over the brigade, I wrote to all the wives of the battalion and group commanders and told them that I wanted them to know that we were a close family out there and we were going to look after each other. Further, we didn't want them worrying about us any more than necessary, and to take care of themselves so we wouldn't have to be concerned about them. When I went to Hap Adams' funeral up in West Point I saw his wife, and she said, "Jack, you came home too soon." That was like a stab.

All in all, Vietnam would have been a great deal more pleasant memory had the whole thing turned out better. I look back on Vietnam with very mixed emotions. I went into it in a saddened condition because of my family situation, and I came out of it in a saddened condition because of the helicopter tragedy, but our accomplishments were noteworthy. Relative to the rest of the Army, we were blessed and we did good work. Working with Dave Parker was a real pleasure. I also enjoyed Jack Dillard for the little time I knew him.

My driver, Corporal [William] Comenose, is now a successful businessman in Cleveland and stays in touch. So, unless you have some questions, I don't have too much more to add about Vietnam.

Q: I wanted to ask you about the engineer command structure in Vietnam when you got there. You talked about the battalions and the groups. What was above the 18th?

A: We had the engineer command, U.S. Army Engineer Command, Vietnam, a separate element of the U.S. Army, Vietnam. It was commanded by General David Parker and later General John [Jack] Dillard. They reported to General Westmoreland and General [Creighton] Abrams and worked with their staffs. The engineer section within the headquarters of the U.S. Army, Vietnam, advised the CINC [commander in chief] on engineer matters in his planning, leaving the engineer command to execute the program and oversee the troops.

Q: Was there something called the Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam, when you were there?

A: Yes. That's USACAV, U.S. Army Construction Agency, Vietnam.

Q: USACAV.

A: If I'm not mistaken, that included people like Morrison Knudsen, J. A. Jones, et cetera and performed major contract construction.

Q: Contractors.

A: Contractors.

Q: So the 18th Brigade was supporting the LOC program?

A: The LOC program was a factor. First, however, was the support of the combat divisions. This was an organizational decision. In other words, a specific combat battalion was aligned with a major troop unit. The 20th Engineer Battalion was designated to support the 4th Infantry Division for example. It was then up to the battalion commander of the 20th to liaise with the engineer battalion commander of the 4th Infantry Division, which happened to be Lieutenant Colonel Vald Heiberg. I would advise the division commander which 18th Brigade battalion was to provide support and that his needs would take priority over anything else. Once arranged, the divisional support plan worked well.

The LOC program took more brigade-level leadership, management, and attention. We met at least weekly to discuss progress, deadlines, equipment needs, supplies, parts, et cetera, and the weather. The monsoons presented unique problems for the engineers. From October through January much work would be lost, equipment and campsites drenched, et cetera and, of course, disruption of LOC completion plans.

Then evening activities occurred. Our headquarters area was secured by a Korean infantry regiment. The Korean regiment was an excellent unit. One night the Vietcong threw satchel charges into the wards at Cam Ranh Hospital. You may remember that. [Lieutenant] General [Charles A.] Cochran was the corps commander, and when I saw him a week or so later, he seemed upset. I didn't know why so I asked him. He felt I had allowed the Vietcong to get into the hospital there.

Although security was a mission of the Korean infantry, I was the senior officer of the area, and therefore he looked to me to do something about it.

I then took over the job and became responsible for the security. It was never ordered or anything, but the Korean regimental commander understood he had to respond to me. As it happened, our brigade camp was hit frequently because we were near the Vietcong trail between the hills and the coast. They'd lob stuff at us, and every time they'd hit us, this Korean colonel would come over with a gift. I had a whole roomful of gifts before it was all over.

The Korean regimental commander, although very conscientious about his work, couldn't keep the Vietcong from firing a couple of rounds at us every couple of nights.

In 1969, the 18th Brigade headquarters didn't have an officers' club or lounge. So the officers got together and built what would be an officers lounge. Really, it was not much bigger than this room we're in now, maybe 20 by 10 or 15.

Anyhow, the night we opened it, we invited some local friends to come over in the afternoon to christen this club. Well, I guess the Vietcong were upset because they were not invited. We no sooner got in the club than they whammed one right in on top of us. Fortunately they didn't have very good aim, but the club was a very nervous place to be for the next couple of weeks.

Occasionally I would go to Saigon to meetings with General Parker. I'd stay with him in his hutch, his place. The 20th Brigade was commanded by Hal Parfitt, General Parfitt. His sergeant major was Van Autreve, whom I mentioned earlier as a first sergeant in the 8th Engineers when I was the battalion commander in Korea some years earlier. The 20th Brigade was later commanded by Ed O'Donald, Brigadier General O'Donald, who would replace me in Omaha in a few years.

The 18th and 20th were competitors to see who could build the most roads. O'Donald's program was to build one kilometer of road a day-"A Klick a Day." The 18th worked on a monthly, not

a daily basis. Our program was called "Operation Last Chance" because the troop drawdown had begun. We were soon to lose two battalions [the 70th and the 116th], so this was our last chance to get the LOC working.

To kick off "Operation Last Chance" we took time to get our plants, supplies, and equipment in good shape. Then we went to work. I don't remember the mileage or anything, but the results were many miles of good roads in record time.

Jim Donovan came up with a plan to use cold mix which could be stockpiled for use as a base course. When needed it could be spread cold and compacted. It wasn't bad. In fact, it was quite good, and we could place a lot more pavement in the same length of time. An innovative idea that paid off. Cold mix also deterred mining once spread and compacted on the roadway. By the time we left, I estimate we had finished about 80 percent of the roads that we were to build.

When I left, General Jack Dillard got me to Tan Son Nhut where I boarded the airplane. All aboard the plane were cheering getting ready to leave. We taxied down the runway when the plane stopped, turned around and went back. We thought, "This can't be happening to us." I don't remember now why it went back, but it was a minor problem, fixed, and away we went. That was the end of that. Next stop USA at BWI [Baltimore-Washington International].

On the personal side, everybody was entitled to two weeks off, and it was important to take the two weeks because of the pressures. As I mentioned, we suffered more casualties than any other unit in Vietnam for 3 of the 12 months I was there.

My cousin from California wrote a letter saying she and her husband were going to be in Hong Kong 20 November 1969 and asked if I could come and spend the weekend with them. Well, that was some idea. I mean, right here in the middle of the war to take off for a weekend to Hong Kong! I had enough notice and the more I thought about it, the more it seemed like a good idea. So I did that. We spent several nice days together. It was short, but I was there long enough to get into the oriental rug business. The Star Ferry Terminal, Kowloon, contained many shops, one of which sold oriental rugs. So I picked out three rugs, and I told him I'd come get those later. A month or so later I used another four days, returned to Hong Kong, and then I really got into the rug business.

Another officer in the battalion and I went to Australia and used my last week. The trip was so nice Gerry and I went back some years later.

I had used my 14 days, and except for one Sunday, there were no other days off. On that Sunday afternoon General Parker and I and some others went snorkeling in the South China Sea off of Na Trang. I don't remember another single day we didn't work. For recreation we played volleyball in combat boots in the evenings. One of our players, Captain Joe Ballard, later commanded the 18th Brigade in Europe and Fort Leonard Wood as a major general and is now Chief of Engineers.

Q: You said you wanted to go back to Nixon's beginning to withdraw troops in June 1969.

A: Thank you. One unit worth noting was the 116th Engineer Combat Battalion from Idaho. I think it was the only National Guard engineer battalion in Vietnam, and it was an outstanding battalion. They were located on the far western edge of the brigade area at Bao Loc.

They had their own little group of Vietcong that messed around with them at first. Those engineers were excellent shots, and during the first couple of attacks they knocked off a bunch of Vietcong. That cooled down the situation, and they weren't bothered too much. Also their equipment deadline rate was fantastic, I mean, like 2 or 4 percent, which was unheard of in Vietnam. Discipline was good. The battalion commander was sharp. I can only say nice things

about it. They were the first battalion to stand down. The next was the 70th. Colonel Jim Hays had that battalion, and he shows up later in the Israeli airfield business.

We replaced the 169th at Bao Loc with the 116th Engineer Battalion, which had been beaten up very badly over on the east coast north of Qui Nhon. The Vietcong must have watched the 169th leave because the 116th was in trouble the whole time they were at Bao Loc. They never could get the enemy straightened out like the 169th did.

Q: At the outset, was the engineer withdrawal taken mostly out of the LOC effort?

A: These were both combat battalions. The LOC effort survived the drawdown longer.

Q: I know that deadlined equipment and getting parts had been a problem.

A: It had been a problem, but there are books written on this thing that are much more detailed. The one thing I know is that the LOC system worked quite well. If we had a piece of equipment go down, we had an instant replacement. Now, if it had been military-issued equipment, we would not have had that luxury. General Clarke convinced the Army not to do the LOC work with ordinary military equipment and he was on target.

Q: Were you involved at all with the Vietnamization program?

A: Yes. That's why the 299th got in trouble. Yes, we had a lot to do with the Vietnamization program. The brigade supported the advisory groups, local mayors, and district leaders. Of course, the 299th got in trouble because the Vietnamese security left the scene of battle when the fighting started. The Vietnamization program ultimately fell to the enemy.

Strangely enough, the North Vietnamese Army came the same route more or less that trapped the French near Dien Bien Phu which was in the 18th Brigade area. The Vietnamization program was all right in concept, I think. It had a chance, but it didn't work. Something failed because of poor leadership at the national senior Army levels.

Q: What was the state of the Vietnamese engineer units?

A: We tried very hard to integrate them into our work, and I would say they were weak, basically. The equipment was tough for them. We were training them on the equipment. I don't recall now any Vietnamese engineer unit building roads, for example, of the type we were building. I don't recall them being involved with the LOC program during my tour-maybe later. We did have cooperative projects-bridges and things like that-particularly secondary roads.

Q: They had difficulty recruiting good caliber officers, didn't they?

A: I don't remember that. I remember that some of the Vietnam divisions were led by some outstanding generals. General Stillwell, General Zais after him, were very high on the Vietnamese First Division commander. The battalion commanders were all right. I don't have any recollection of any problems with the Vietnamese engineers. We didn't work with them as much as you might have thought. I remember visiting the Vietnamese engineer group's battalion commanders and having them to our place for meetings. Coordination was ongoing. It's possible that there were missions that I just don't recall. All of our battalion and group commanders kept close contact with the Vietnamese units in their areas. My feeling today is there wasn't enough time to do good training before transition.

Q: You mentioned one other topic earlier, and I wondered if you might want to expand on it. I find it very interesting. You said that the engineer units didn't have the morale problems or the drug problems that some other units had.

A: I can remember spotty drug problems, mostly marijuana. I emphasize spotty because our soldiers were busy and at night went to bed. Nothing like the problems we had in World War II with the poor attitude in my 2d Battalion. As mentioned, we had very good officers all the way through the system, and we had conscientious enlisted personnel. As time went on, the noncommissioned officers became weaker because replacements didn't have the experience. I just feel that the secret to the 18th Engineer Brigade's morale and discipline situation was the fact that we had a clear mission, were organized to do it, and worked hard at it. The worst thing for a soldier is to have nothing to do, particularly if he's in a foxhole.

Q: What about the one-year tour?

A: It created leadership and performance problems. It was hard to retrain our combat efficiency every year. It was not a good scenario. The whole war was not well structured, as I look back on it. The one-year tour was part of the problem. I don't know of anybody that liked the one-year tour except the individual when his tour was over.

To summarize the Vietnam experience into just a compact thought, some things came to my mind. One was we really needed to do something about the Army. Regardless of the sentiment about the Vietnam War or the way it was done, our Army wasn't as good as it should have been.

Also, I learned again the importance of leadership of the troops and the value of remembering families, even though remote. I think the letter I wrote to the families was valuable. Another was

A reunion of former commanders of the 18th Engineer Brigade held in 1972. Left to right, MG William Roper, MG John W. Morris, MG John Eider, MG Andrew Rollins, MG Charles Duke (Ret.), MG Robert R. Ploger and MG Henry Shrader.

the outstanding people with whom I became associated, the officers especially. The 18th Brigade was blessed not only with a good mission but with good people to achieve it. I have always had great respect for the enlisted people, but in Vietnam I was particularly saddened that the soldiers caught so much adverse criticism when they came home after they had survived some terrible circumstances-the weather, climate, the environment, and, of course, the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army.

So Vietnam didn't add a totally new experience in the same sense that Legislative Liaison, Tulsa, and Goose Bay had, but it did bring me up to speed on the military side and it restored my understanding of the Army at an important time. I think it laid the foundation on which to shape an improved Army and Army engineers.

Of all the things that happened, the one thing that will always be paramount in my memory is that terrible helicopter event. The only reason General Shrader didn't go was because he was in the middle of his orientation when General Abrams directed General Dillard to recon this road. I assume the decision was to have Shrader continue his orientation. Otherwise, he'd have been on that chopper too. If I'd been over there, we'd have had a very tough situation because the pilot, for whom I had the greatest respect, had recommended they not fly it because of heavy fire the previous day.

I probably would have sided with the pilot. Then General Dillard and I probably would have been opposing each other. I also understand the pilot asked to go high, and General Dillard indicated he had to go low to see what was down there. So where I would have fit into that if I'd stayed, I don't know. Anyhow, that was a very painful event which has left an indelible mark. Tragically, the recon was for naught in any case. A real waste.

In hindsight I consider Vietnam basically a utilization experience, which challenged my leadership capabilities learned and developed over 25 years. I owed the troops and our mission my best. To a lesser degree it was a learning milestone which would be valuable in follow-on assignments. Of course, combat experience is important for a soldier's record. Did it make any difference in my performance over the next ten years? I am not sure, but I sincerely hope my presence was of some value to those with whom I served in the 18th Brigade. Certainly, their value to me was immeasurable and proved irreplaceable from 1970to 1980.

Missouri River Division

Q: In the summer of 1970 you left Vietnam and came back as division engineer of the Missouri River Division [MRD]. When did you learn about that assignment?

A: I first heard that I was going to the Missouri River Division while still in Vietnam. General Clarke made a second visit in the spring of 1970 and indicated he was thinking about sending me to Missouri River Division when I returned.

I had been promoted to brigadier general in August 1969 after waiting since March 1968. I would report to MRD as a brigadier general. The Missouri River Division had been a dynamic leadership-type activity for many, many years, particularly during General Pick's tour, the Pick-Sloan plan, and the construction of the Missouri River projects. By 1970, the amount of work had decreased, and my impression, while still in Vietnam, was that the Missouri River Division wasn't very busy. However, to be assigned to a division was my personal ambition at the time, and I was sure General Clarke had made the decision for good reasons, so I didn't question it, even though I felt that I was not going to be as busy as I might have been in a different division. That proved, incidentally, to be wrong. Thankfully or fortunately. On returning to the

States, John was a cadet at the Military Academy, having entered in the summer of 1969, shortly after I went to Vietnam. Our daughter was graduating from the University of Connecticut and going to work as a teacher in Northern Virginia. So the move to Omaha involved only my wife and myself, basically. We acquired a new automobile and drove from Arlington to Omaha and rented a flat on the ninth floor of an apartment building. Susan moved into our home in Arlington with much of our fumiture, so the move was easy, and wewere able to get to Omaha and be ready to go to work in short order.

On arriving, I was surprised to find that the morale of the division was quite low and that there wasn't much enthusiasm at that time. For many years the Missouri River Division had been a very popular federal activity in Omaha and throughout the region, particularly because of its public works program in the Missouri River Basin. In many ways the division had become a nonentity; it wasn't very active in civic affairs, et cetera, at that time and rarely received much attention publicly.

The Corps did have a lot of friends there, however, and the family and I were welcomed to Omaha warmly. We were beginning to get ourselves well established when the need to reinvigorate the morale and enthusiasm of the personnel in the division became obvious. That meant identifying the problem which, as it turned out, was not so much the lack of work but the general abuse and criticism that was being heaped on the Corps as a result of the National Environmental Policy Act [NEPA] which had been passed only a couple of months before my assignment in the Missouri River Division began. It did not take very long to realize that the most important concern during my period at the division was going to be the environment.

Those of us who were in positions of responsibility in the 1970 decade learned that the environmental movement impacted seriously on every phase of the Corps of Engineers' activities. We found ourselves trying to catch up with a law that had been passed with no grandfathering aspects. Consequently, every project we had under construction or even in operation, for that matter, was, in some measure, not in compliance with the law.

The Corps and the nation were fortunate that General Clarke was the Chief of Engineers at that time. One of the first things I had to do as new division engineer was attend a course of instruction in environmental matters at Aspen, along with General Clarke and others. The course was titled the Seminar on the Environment and Sciences. The program was run by a lady named Betty Willard. It was a very good course which gave an insight into the environmental philosophy and did make a significant impact.

When I got to Aspen, Vietnam was still vivid. Vietnam was a place where survival was really the name of the game, and the local people were in distress to just find enough food to stay alive. So naturally I had a difficult time adjusting to some of the impacts of the environmental philosophy on human needs. However, perhaps the reality of Vietnam made the ultimate understanding and respect of environmental objectives more meaningful for me.

In any case, a problem facing Army engineers at that time was the national attitude towards the military in general following the Vietnam situation coupled with the attitude towards engineers in general, which was not very complimentary because of the environmental program. Together, in the part of the United States that was probably most sensitive to environmental objectives, these made for a fairly sporty course for the military engineer.

The real leadership problem, it seemed to me, was how to generate within the Missouri River Division a strong motivation and belief that the work the Corps was doing was good, in the national interest, and one in which we should have pride. To understand the scope of this program, you must realize that the Missouri River Division's civil works boundary included the entire drainage of the Missouri River, also a strong center of environmental activists